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!Humor can be dissected as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process 
and the innards are discouraging to any but the pure scientific mind. 
 
—E. B. White, author of Charlotte’s Web 
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PREFACE 
During the final season of the TV series Seinfeld, Elaine dramatically stormed 
down to The New Yorker editor’s office to demand an explanation for an ambiguous 
cartoon, only to find there wasn’t one: the editor admitted he merely “liked the kitty.” 
The episode, entitled “The Cartoon” and written by real-life New Yorker cartoonist Bruce 
Eric Kaplan, is undoubtedly a humorous illustration of art imitating life. 
In an example of life imitating art, current cartoon editor Robert Mankoff was 
also recently asked to explain a cartoon that appeared in The New Yorker (Mankoff, 
2012). He cites E. B. White’s famous quote as a disclaimer before attempting to quantify 
the otherwise unquantifiable experience of comedy, warning readers that dissecting the 
cartoon would likely spoil its joke—and perhaps even all humor in general. Reluctantly, 
Mankoff ranks ambiguity and incongruity high among humor’s essential ingredients. 
This year, University of California San Diego psychologists joined forces with 
Mankoff to more scientifically examine comedy in a study of gender differences, 
revealing what some may argue is another key feature of humor. Pitting women’s 
abilities against men’s in the creation of humorous captions for a selection of New Yorker 
cartoons, men very slightly but significantly outperformed women in the comedy 
department, thereby providing a kernel of truth to the stereotype that men are funnier than 
women. And in a second study, which perhaps serves to perpetuate or even explain this 
stereotype, both men and women misremembered the more humorous captions as having 
been written by men (Mickes, Walker, Parris, Mankoff, & Christenfeld, 2012).  
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Previous psychologists who were also interested in examining what makes 
cartoons funny employed a novel and implicit manipulation of the “facial feedback 
hypothesis.” According to the hypothesis, emotions can begin on the outside and affect 
how we feel inside (Buck, 1980). In an effort to simulate emotions as outside-in, Strack, 
Martin, and Stepper (1988) contracted either participants’ “smiling muscles” or their 
“frowning muscles” to see if these artificially-originated facial expressions would 
influence participants’ experience of humor when assigning ratings to cartoons.  
To achieve this, the researchers had participants grasp a pen between their teeth  
(producing a smile) or between their lips—creating a frown. Unlike previous scientists’ 
recreations of emotions through muscle and electrode stimulation, Strack et al.’s (1988) 
participants performed the cartoon rating exercise under the guise of a pilot study on 
coordination to help gain insight into workarounds for people with physical impairments. 
This cover story ensured that participants would be unaware that their smiling and 
frowning muscles had been implicitly activated and prevented participants’ realization 
that these activations might impact their humor ratings of cartoons.   
It should not be surprising that Strack et al. (1988) found that participants rated 
cartoons as funnier when holding a pen between their teeth than those who held a pen 
between their lips. Moreover, the authors demonstrated that this effect occurred in the 
absence of participants’ awareness that these facial expressions had even been activated. 
In other words, judgments of humor were implicitly increased under the “facilitating 
condition” of a smile and implicitly decreased under the “inhibiting condition” of a 
frown. These results were replicated in a second study and, importantly, were limited to 
ratings made by participants who were instructed to rely on their affective and subjective 
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reactions to the cartoons vs. those who were asked to arrive at objective, cognitive-based 
humor ratings.   
Around the same time, a Belgian researcher observed that attractiveness ratings 
for letters of the alphabet were also influenced by an implicit process that operated 
outside of participants’ awareness: their positive self-associations for name letters 
(Nuttin, 1985; 1987). In other words, judgments of letter attractiveness were implicitly 
increased under the facilitating condition of shared letter similarity. In the years that 
followed, this “name letter effect” was found to extend to both mundane and important 
decision-making, while moderators that served to bolster or attenuate the effect were also 
discovered and still continue to be identified.  
Drawing inspiration from the findings of Strack et al.’s (1988) humor judgments 
experiment and research on the name letter effect, the author of the present study 
wondered whether the “facilitating condition” of shared first name initials with cartoon 
caption writers would implicitly increase participant judges’ humor ratings for these 
writers’ captions in a “mock” New Yorker cartoon caption contest. Would participants’ 
positive self-associations for their own name letters unwittingly influence their 
evaluations of cartoon captions written by writers who shared their initial letter, relative 
to captions written by writers with dissimilar initial letters and as compared to 
evaluations made by non-initial matching participants? If found, would this effect be 
influenced by both old and new moderating variables? The present study sought to 
answer these and other questions about the name letter effect in judgments of humor. To 
this pure scientific mind, dissecting the experience of humor in search of its implicit 
egotism innards would prove quite interesting indeed.
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ABSTRACT 
The present study demonstrates that implicit egotism is relevant to not only letter 
attractiveness ratings on the Name Letter Test (NLT), but also to judgments of humor—
albeit to a lesser degree. Respondents participated as “mock” judges in a simulated 
cartoon caption contest and evaluated writers’ caption submissions for two cartoons. It 
was hypothesized that participants would exhibit biases toward captions submitted by 
writers with whom they shared a first initial letter, and additionally, their gender. A name 
letter effect was found in participants’ judgments of humor and on the NLT. Shared 
gender with a caption writer—when coupled with a shared initial—increased biases 
toward these writers’ captions, but not significantly so. The impact of implicit self-esteem 
on initial-letter biases was examined, with level of implicit self-esteem weakly predicting 
NLT biases, but not biases demonstrated toward captions submitted by same-initial 
writers. While name-letter preferences are believed to tap implicit self-esteem, less than 
one-third of participants demonstrated high implicit self-esteem, despite the very large 
name letter effect observed on the NLT. This challenges the notion that people 
overwhelmingly possess the positive self-attitudes thought to ignite implicit egotism. 
Recent researchers have suggested that the NLT is best understood as a measure for 
which it was first designed—implicit egotism, the tendency to display automatic self-
positivity biases toward targets that share our self-attributes—instead of a measure of 
implicit self-esteem. This possibility is discussed and explored with analyses of the 




By most standards, psychologists have only somewhat recently begun to examine 
people’s profound affection for the attribute that is most closely related to the self, i.e., 
one’s own name—a principle that human relations guru Dale Carnegie taught his students 
more than three quarters of a century ago. Carnegie (1936) asserted that “there is no 
sweeter sound than one’s own name” almost 50 years before Nuttin (1985, 1987) would 
experimentally demonstrate people’s preferences for their name letters over non-name 
letters in the social psychological phenomenon known as “the name letter effect.”  
Researchers have since found name-letter preferences to extend beyond just 
mundane decision-making. This automatic and unconscious bias appears to manifest 
itself in not only everyday decisions, but important ones as well such as people’s 
preferences for places of residence, careers, and even mates. Because choosing a place to 
live, career, or life partner because of shared name letters is unlikely to reflect a 
conscious decision, researchers have labeled this phenomenon “implicit egotism” 
(Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002). The study of implicit egotism has predominantly 
focused on people’s profound affection for their own name letters. However, some 
researchers argue that virtually any self-attribute, including something as trivial as shared 
birthdates or birthday numbers (Kityama & Karasawa, 1997; Pelham et al., 2002; see also 
Finch & Cialdini, 1989), can foster implicit egotism. 
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Interesting paradigms have been used to study the seemingly illogical yet 
predictable decisions we make as a result of our implicit positive biases we have toward 
our name letters and other self-attributes. In a series of ten different studies, Pelham et al. 
(2002) demonstrated that important life decisions can fall prey to implicit egotism. First, 
they discovered that people are disproportionately more likely to live in cities and states 
that resemble their names. Specifically, U.S. citizens were more likely to move to or 
reside in places that shared several letters of their first or last name (Louis’s 
disproportionately populate St. Louis and Louisiana) or places that resembled their 
birthday numbers (a disproportionate number of people born on May 5
th
 live in Five 
Points, Alabama). Follow-up studies have found similar effects where individuals’ 
surnames match the street on which they choose to live (Pelham, Carvallo, DeHart, & 
Jones, 2003).   
Another major life decision influenced by implicit egotism is that of career 
choice. Pelham et al. (2002) found that a disproportionate number of people whose names 
begin with “Den” (e.g., Denis and Denise) make their livelihoods as dentists, while 
names beginning with “La” (e.g., Larry and Laura) are overrepresented within the law 
profession. Similarly, authors of scholarly articles in the geosciences are more likely than 
chance to be named George and Geoffrey. 
But perhaps the most significant life decision studied by implicit egotism 
researchers to date is that of mate selection. Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, and Mirenberg 
(2004) found evidence that brides and grooms gravitate toward spouses whose first 
names share letters with their own. These authors also observed surname-matching 
effects for married couples, despite our culture’s strong taboos against incest.   
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In sum, implicit egotism researchers have found the name letter effect to be quite 
robust, extending to both everyday and important decisions. Moreover, name-letter 
preferences are not merely an American phenomenon, but rather, have been demonstrated 
in other countries and cultures as well (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Kityama & Karasawa, 1997, 
Hoorens & Todorova, 1988; Nuttin, 1987). Researchers have examined several different 
possible mediating mechanisms underlying the name letter effect, each of which will be 
described below. 
What Mediates the Name Letter Effect? 
The Primacy Effect 
One explanation for name-letter preferences that has since been discounted is “the 
primacy effect.” Researchers Hoorens and Todorova (1988) compared Bulgarian 
students’ preferences for their name letters in their native and second languages. They 
hypothesized that if the name letter effect is simply due to a primacy effect of the name 
letters these students learned first in their native language, then they should not prefer 
their name letters over non-name letters in a later-learned second language. Preferences 
for name letters, however, were found for both the Bulgarians’ native Cyrillic alphabet 
and within the Roman alphabet they learned in a second, more recently acquired language 
(Hoorens & Todorova, 1988).  
The Mere Exposure Effect 
The “mere exposure effect” suggests that we prefer things with which we are 
familiar, therefore repeated exposure to them can increase both familiarity and ultimately 
liking (Zajonc, 1968). Moreover, instead of being a cognitive or post-cognitive 
phenomenon, this effect appears to be a purely affective experience, occurring 
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independently of any intervening cognitive processes (Zajonc, 1980). If we encounter our 
name letters more frequently than the other letters of the alphabet, then according to the 
mere exposure effect, perhaps this is why we prefer them.  
Kitayama and Karasawa (1997), however, ruled out the mere exposure effect as a 
possible mediator of preferences for numbers that make up one’s birthday, a form of 
implicit egotism similar to name-letter preferences. Participants in their study exhibited 
stronger preferences for birth date numbers 13-31 than the numbers 1-12, despite 
encountering the numbers 1-12 more frequently in everyday life (Kitayama & Karasawa, 
1997). These findings demonstrate the link between number preferences and our positive 
bias toward objects related to the self, while simultaneously ruling out mere exposure as a 
mediating variable. 
In another study, researchers Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Hetts (2002) found 
that people prefer six of the most frequently used letters of the alphabet (A, E, I, N, S, 
and T) to the six least often used letters (J, K, Q, W, X, and Z). These preferences, 
however, were overshadowed by biases toward name letters, suggesting again that the 
name letter effect is a product of something much more than mere exposure. In fact, 
people with rare initials preferred their initial letters more than two of the most frequently 
occurring letters, E and S (Jones et al., 2002). These findings staunchly challenge mere 
exposure as a mediator of name-letter biases. If name-letter preferences were in fact due 
to the mere exposure effect, these preferences should be much less pronounced for people 
with uncommon initials since they are not exposed to these letters very frequently.  
Finally, two other studies in which ownership of name-related and non-name-
related “symbols” were induced provide additional evidence against mere exposure’s role 
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in self-related preferences (Feys, 1991). In these experiments, participants were equally 
exposed to novel symbols that they were led to believe either belonged to their own or 
someone else’s name. Name-related biases still occurred, i.e., participants preferred 
symbols associated with their own name more than those associated with another 
person’s name without having been exposed to their name-related symbols more 
frequently (Feys, 1991).   
Evaluative Conditioning 
Having failed to find support for mere exposure as a determinant of name-related 
preferences, Feys (1995) set out to test another hypothesis that might explain the name 
letter effect. The author was intrigued by the evidence he found that mere ownership can 
be temporarily induced in a laboratory setting and also that this newly-found ownership 
was strong enough to create preferences for symbols associated with the self. Moreover, 
this effect did not appear to be a function of classical conditioning since the author 
controlled for the duration of symbol induction (the number of trials it took participants 
to learn self- vs. other-related symbols) or mere exposure since participants were exposed 
equally to self- vs. other-related symbols. Feys (1995) next decided to examine the role 
“evaluative conditioning” might play in self-related preferences in a follow-up study. 
Since implicit egotism embodies the positive biases we have toward objects 
related to the self, it implies a mediating relationship between exposure to these objects 
and our preferences for them. As such, it is believed to elicit an affective—albeit 
implicit—response to these attributes or objects en route. “Evaluative conditioning,” on 
the other hand, is not considered a “true” mediator since it occurs automatically without 
any affective or cognitive processing. For example, very early research by Syz (1926) 
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demonstrated that of fifty different stimuli presented, the one that achieved the most 
frequent (84% of the time) automatic galvanic skin responses for participants was his or 
her own name. For these reasons argues Fey (1995), evaluative conditioning—if 
supported—would be a much more “parsimonious” explanation than the mere ownership 
hypothesis because it is purely automatic and occurs without any intervening processes.  
To examine evaluative conditioning as a potential mediator of name-related 
preferences, Feys (1995) visually paired Japanese Kanji symbols with participants’ name 
letters and non-name letters. In a control condition, participants were instructed to simply 
remember which symbols corresponded to their own versus another’s name without the 
aid of “visual pairing” (seeing the Kanji symbol alongside Roman alphabet letters). In 
both conditions, participants preferred the symbols associated with his or her own name 
more strongly than symbols associated with another person’s name. However, this effect 
was even stronger in the non-evaluative conditioning (no visual pairing) control condition 
where participants simply remembered that the symbols were name-related. These results 
led Feys (1995) to conclude that evaluative conditioning is not necessary to elicit name-
related preferences (in his experiment, simply knowing the symbols were name-relevant 
was sufficient) and that “mere ownership” is a more likely determinant. Mere ownership, 
while similar to implicit egotism, differs in that it often embodies an explicit awareness 
that a stimulus object is “mine.” Implicit egotism, on the other hand, occurs outside of 
our conscious awareness, i.e., is driven by an implicit process or unconscious mechanism. 
Subjective Frequency 
Researchers Hoorens and Nuttin (1993) tested the hypothesis that the name letter 
effect might be attributable to an exaggerated subjective frequency of exposure to one’s 
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name letters. As Nuttin (1985; 1987) was the first researcher to identify the name letter 
effect, the purpose of his and Hoorens’s 1993 study was to test an alternative hypothesis 
that might explain this phenomenon. Previous researchers had already demonstrated that 
people’s affective reactions to objects might be driven by their perceived (vs. their actual) 
familiarity with them (Matlin, 1971; Moreland & Zajonc, 1977, 1979). Based on this 
principle, Hoorens and Nuttin (1993) considered that name letters might be preferred 
simply because people overestimate their exposure to them and thus their familiarity with 
them.   
While subjective frequency for name letters was somewhat exaggerated, the 
authors found no relationship between name-letter preferences and participants’ reports 
of their subjective frequency of exposure to these letters (Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993). The 
authors did, however, find evidence of a name letter effect, which was strengthened when 
participants believed that their name a) would suit someone they admired from the same 
gender, b) would suit a member of a professional group to which they would like to 
belong, and c) carried a strong likelihood of being chosen as a name for themselves if 
they had had the opportunity to so choose.  
Implicit Self-Esteem 
Intrigued by their discovery that numerous Dutch nationals still kept their 
ancestors’ surnames that were chosen out of rebellion and carried unfavorable 
translations, Koole and Pelham (2003) also decided to investigate the underpinnings of 
the name letter effect. The authors believed that the Dutch’s commitment to these made-
up names suggested an underlying implicit favorable self-attitude that spilled over into a 
fondness for their surname self-attribute. After performing a comprehensive review of 
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studies on the name letter effect, they argue that name-letter preferences are most likely 
driven by one’s implicit self-esteem for the following reasons. First, name letters 
represent a self-attribute. Secondly, letter preferences largely reflect a positive bias 
toward own-name letters. Thirdly, these preferences operate outside of one’s awareness 
(“implicitly”), and lastly, no other factors can account for the numerous studies which 
have consistently found biases toward name letters (Koole & Pelham, 2003). 
Since then, researchers have begun to explore the relationship between self-
esteem and name-letter preferences. After subjecting participants to self-esteem-
enhancing conditioning, Dijksterhuis (2004) found stronger name letter effects for these 
participants compared to controls. By subliminally pairing the word “I” with positive trait 
terms, the author was able to temporarily increase both implicit self-esteem and name-
letter preferences (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Baccus, Baldwin, and Packer (2004) found a 
similar increase in implicit self-esteem and name-letter preferences in an experiment that 
paired self-relevant information with “socially-approving” happy faces. Finally, Jones et 
al. (2004) demonstrated that temporary threats to the self-concept increased attraction to a 
potential dating partner whose screen name shared letters of participants’ names. Taken 
together, these studies appear to suggest at least some underlying component of self-
esteem in name-letter biases. 
Implicit Egotism 
 While often used interchangeably with “implicit self-esteem,” implicit egotism 
refers uniquely to our preferences for self-related objects, which are driven by our 
unconscious positive self-biases (Pelham et al., 2005). Whether these automatic positivity 
biases that are overwhelmingly displayed in peoples’ preferences for self-related objects 
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suggest an equally overwhelming and underlying incidence of favorable implicit self-
esteem is debatable. Recent researchers Buhrmester, Blanton, and Swann, (2011) argue 
that two widely used measures of implicit self-esteem, the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and the Name Letter Test (NLT; Nuttin, 1985; 
1987), do not measure participants’ implicit global evaluations of the self. Rather, these 
authors believe that the IAT is a more appropriate measure of implicit affect and the NLT 
is best understood as a measure of the tendency to display automatic self-positivity 
biases, i.e., “implicit egotism”—instead of a tool to measure implicit self-esteem 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011).   
At first, some researchers questioned the “implicitness” of their own findings after 
discovering the strongest effects occurred when entire names matched a target (e.g., a 
state where one chooses to live), however, their follow-up study provided irrefutable 
evidence that implicit egotism is indeed implicit. In their self-described “strictest test of 
implicit egotism” to date, these authors found men participants demonstrated increased 
attraction to a photograph of a woman after subliminally pairing her football jersey 
number with these participants’ names (Jones et al., 2004).  
Even outside of the psychology laboratory, consciously choosing a career, 
residence, or mate because of shared name letters is ultimately not only foolhardy, but 
improbable. Regardless of the mechanism underlying name-letter preferences, it seems as 
though most researchers agree that it is implicit. Pelham et al. (2005) point out that 
significant life decisions regarding careers, places of residence, and mate selection are 
highly unlikely to be a product of “explicit egotism” when these choices share letters with 
one’s own name. And finally, in all of the above experiments studying name-letter 
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preferences, researchers very seldom ever reported that participants were able to guess 
the hypotheses of their studies. This further supports the notion that our bias toward our 
name letters operates outside of our awareness.  
Moderators of the Name Letter Effect 
The identification of moderators of the name letter effect has further strengthened 
the evidence that our positive (in valence, but not necessarily in content) self-biases are 
indeed responsible for name-letter preferences. In addition to previous researchers’ 
findings that unique name letters (Jones et al., 2002; Pelham et al., 2002) and self-esteem 
enhancement (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Baccus et al., 2004) can intensify the name letter 
effect, other variables such as gender (Pelham et al., 2002; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997) 
and self-concept threats (Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2005; Jones et al., 
2004, 2002) have also been found to differentially influence preferences for name letters. 
Uniqueness of Name 
Having an uncommon name serves to strengthen the name letter effect and—as 
mentioned previously with respect to rare initials—simultaneously discounts mere 
exposure as a determinant of name-letter preferences (Jones et al., 2002; Pelham et al., 
2002). For example, one study found that people with unique names exhibited stronger 
biases than people with more common names as evidenced by the disproportionate 
number of people residing in states that resembled their own (uncommon) name (Pelham 
et al., 2002). This finding again challenges mere exposure as an explanation for the effect 
because the mere exposure hypothesis argues that people develop preferences after 
repeated exposure to the object or stimulus. However, people with unique names do not 
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encounter their names with the same frequency as do those with more common names, 
therefore biases toward name-letter cannot be explained by mere exposure.   
Gender Differences 
In addition to finding “letter position” effects, i.e., participants preferred the first 
letter of their names (initial) more strongly than other letters in their names, Kitayama 
and Karasawa (1997) found significant gender differences among name-letter 
preferences. Specifically, initial-letter preferences were stronger for men’s surname 
initial than for their first name initial, while females demonstrated stronger biases toward 
their first initial than their surname initial. The authors explain this gender difference as 
owing to men’s and women’s differential association between the self and their first vs. 
last names. Whereas Japanese men are expected to carry on their family names when 
married, women are expected to change their last name to that of their husband’s upon 
marriage. Therefore, a stronger sense of self is derived by men from their last names, 
while women derive their sense of self more from their first names as this is the name 
that will remain with them throughout their lifetime (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). 
Gender differences were also found in Pelham et al.’s (2002) study which 
examined the likelihood of living in a state as a function of one’s first name. Males were 
26% more likely than chance to reside in states that resembled their first name (i.e., 
Kenneths disproportionately populated the state of Kentucky), while females were 44% 
more likely than chance to live in first-name matching states. Additional analyses that 
focused on state immigration data and the populations of “Saint” cities also revealed 
stronger evidence of implicit egotism among females when these states and cities 
resembled their first name (Pelham et al., 2002). Because the tradition of women taking 
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their husbands’ last names upon marriage is customary in the U.S. as well, it stands to 
reason that American females would also derive a stronger sense of self from their first 
names and exhibit—on an unconscious level—a greater attraction to and preference for 
places of residence which contain their first name letters. 
Explicit Self-Esteem and Self-Concept Threats 
As previously discussed, name-letter preferences have been found to increase 
after self-esteem enhancement. Likewise, a “threat” to the self-concept can also bolster 
the name letter effect. Ostensibly, one way people protect their sense of self-worth in the 
face of self-concept threats is by automatically enhancing the value of self-associated 
symbols, including exhibiting preferences for name letters. For example, Jones et al. 
(2002) found differential name-letter and birthday-number preferences among 
participants with low and high explicit self-esteem after they experienced a self-concept 
threat. Specifically, evaluations of name letters and birthday numbers were strengthened 
after high explicit self-esteem participants were asked to write about a personal flaw. 
Born from a well-practiced need to self-enhance, preferring our name letters when 
confronted with them can help restore homeostasis to our temporarily injured self-
esteem—much like a defense mechanism. This perspective views name-letter preferences 
as an unconscious form of self-regulation, with this type of self-serving bias particularly 
pronounced for those with high explicit self-esteem. 
Brendl et al. (2005) also found differential effects for name-letter preferences 
after participants either wrote about something they wished to change about themselves 
vs. something positive about themselves. Namely, those who experienced a self-concept 
threat (wrote about a personal flaw) showed stronger biases toward a fictitious brand of 
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Japanese cracker that contained their name letters, while those in the self-affirmation 
condition preferred the name-letter and non-name letter brand equally (Brendl et al., 
2005). Experiencing a threat to the self-concept in and of itself was a motive for 
participants to self-enhance when given the opportunity to evaluate a brand that shared 
their name letters. 
Self-Attitude Accessibility 
Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker (2000) found that explicit measures of self-
esteem given prior to implicit measures—including an initial-preferences task—served to 
increase the correlation between the two types of self-esteem. In Krizan and Suls’ (2008) 
meta-analysis of 10 different studies administering the NLT, the authors found a small 
but significant correlation between the NLT and explicit self-esteem measures. These 
authors also found the following order effects for the two types of measures: explicit 
measures of self-esteem administered prior to the NLT strengthened the correlation, 
while the correlation decreased but was still significant when the NLT was given first. 
This moderating effect of instrument order is explained as participants’ self-attitudes 
becoming more accessible after the administration of explicit self-esteem measures and 
essentially priming one’s own attitudes about oneself (Krizan & Suls, 2008).   
Establishing Mediation and Moderation in  
Future Research on the Name Letter Effect 
In sum, when the study of name-letter preferences was still in its infancy, 
researchers endeavored to identify the type of mechanism underlying the name letter 
effect. Beginning with Hoorens and Todorova (1988), these authors failed to find support 
for mediation via the primacy effect when name-letter preferences were found in both the 
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participants’ native Cyrillic alphabet and their later-learned Roman alphabet. Next, Feys 
(1991) discounted “the mere exposure effect” as a mediator of name-letter biases when 
he induced ownership of name-related and non-name related novel symbols among 
participants by holding the number of learning trials constant for both types of symbols, 
and in the end, still found strong biases toward name-related symbols. Kitayama and 
Karasawa (1997) also failed to find support for “the mere exposure effect” as 
instrumental in producing self-related preferences (birth date numbers) since participants 
still demonstrated biases toward the numbers 13-31, even though we are exposed to the 
numbers 1-12 with greater frequency. Jones et al.’s (2002) finding that people preferred 
their initial-letters more than other letters of the alphabet—even when their initials were 
rare—further discounts “the mere exposure effect” as a determinant of name-letter 
preferences. What this group of experiments tells us about the biases we exhibit toward 
our name letters is that these biases are not due to having been exposed to our name 
letters first in life, nor are they a product of more frequent exposure to our name letters. 
 Hoorens and Nuttin (1993) examined “subjective frequency” as a possible 
mediator of the name letter effect, testing the hypothesis that people prefer their name 
letters because of the false perception that they encounter them more frequently than they 
really do. While participants did somewhat exaggerate the frequency with which they 
encountered their name letters relative to non-name letters, the authors found no 
relationship between the name-letter preferences they observed and participants’ 
subjective reports of their frequency of exposure to these letters. “Evaluative 
conditioning,” while at first promising to be a more parsimonious explanation for name-
letter preferences because it was devoid of both affective and cognitive processing, also 
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failed to be a substantiated mediator since subjects still preferred symbols associated with 
their own-name letters with or without their name letter serving as a visual cue (Feys, 
1995). These researchers consistently found that participants preferred their name letters 
simply because they were just that, “theirs,” and thus “mere ownership” as a mediator of 
the name letter effect paved the way for a closely related determinant and what 
contemporary researchers now refer to as “implicit egotism.”  
Implicit egotism is the underlying process responsible for the name letter effect 
whereby participants’ self-biases spill over into their evaluations of self-related stimuli, 
such as objects that share their name letters. Unlike “mere ownership,” however, implicit 
egotism operates outside of our awareness, whereas the mere ownership effect involves 
an awareness that an object is “mine” and consequently its value is overestimated (see 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990 for one famous empirical example of “the 
endowment effect”). 
 Early researchers’ painstaking efforts to uncover the mediating mechanism 
responsible for the name letter effect all point to an implicit bias toward our own self-
attributes. Pioneering researchers of the name letter effect now believe that one of our 
many self-serving biases is at work and attempts to prove that other motivational and 
cognitive processes are at work would be unfruitful, if not impossible (Hoorens & Nuttin, 
1993). Empirically establishing the mediating mechanism underlying self-related 
preferences is extraordinarily difficult due to the automatic and unconscious nature of 
people’s self-associations and/or self-positivity biases. Moreover, attempting to measure 
these self-associations and biases are liable to change name-letter preferences. Thus, 
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current implicit egotism scholars overwhelmingly focus their research instead on 
studying new moderating variables over mediators. 
Is the NLT Simply a Measure of Implicit Self-Esteem? 
  According to Pelham et al. (2002), implicit egotism reflects “an unconscious 
process grounded in people’s favorable self-associations” and is “an implicit judgmental 
consequence of people’s positive associations” (p. 106). The key assumption underlying 
name-letter preferences is that “people’s positive associations about themselves spill over 
into their evaluations of objects associated with the self” (Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & 
Hetts, 2002, p. 170). Whether the self-associations thought to drive implicit egotism and 
the name letter effect are positive (i.e., “favorable”) in content or are merely positively 
valenced has recently been debated. Implicit egotism and implicit self-esteem are often 
used interchangeably, thus measures of name-letter preferences are often used as indexes 
of people’s unconscious global self-attitudes, i.e., “implicit self-esteem.” Even though 
implicit egotism and implicit self-esteem are similar constructs, there remains some 
disagreement as to whether they are distinct, synonymous, or merely related. 
Researchers such as Greenwald and Banaji (1995) argue that name-letter 
preferences are driven by individuals’ high self-esteem, with these preferences offering a 
glimpse into people’s global evaluations of themselves (Koole & Pelham, 2003). While 
these and other researchers have suggested that implicit egotism is driven by an 
underlying sense of high self-worth, more recent researchers, however, argue that 
measures like the Name Letter Test tap implicit egotism, but not necessarily implicit self-
esteem (Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2011).  
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Buhrmester et al. (2011) are skeptical of the NLT’s psychometric properties as a 
measure of implicit self-esteem because of its poor construct validity, low predictability 
of general well-being/depression, and low correlations with explicit measures of self-
esteem, among other issues. The fact that name-letter preferences are overwhelmingly 
exhibited on the NLT—enough to compel researchers to administer it as a tool to 
measure self-esteem—suggests that respondents are likely relying on automatic, universal 
self-positivity biases instead of providing a window into their global self-worth. If name-
letter preference tasks like the NLT did measure implicit self-esteem, one would expect 
significantly more variability in name-letter biases commensurate with the variability that 
surely exists in the population’s implicit self-esteem. Surely the overwhelming majority 
of people are not fortunate enough to possess high implicit self-esteem. Or are they? 
The jury is still out with respect to whether the NLT is a valid measure of implicit 
self-esteem, or whether it simply taps implicit egotism, the simple tendency to 
unconsciously gravitate toward objects which share our name letters—as it was 
“originally conceptualized” to do (Buhrmester et al., 2001). Examining the conditions 
under which name-letter preferences are bolstered, reduced, or even reversed is therefore 
of great theoretical interest and is important for future research on implicit egotism. 
Pelham et al. (2005) have hailed the role of implicit self-esteem in name-letter 
preferences as one of the next frontiers of implicit egotism, suggesting that biases might 
be reduced or even reversed for those who truly possess negative self-attitudes. If, 
however, Buhrmester et al. (2011) are correct in arguing that implicit egotism instead 
taps a tendency to display automatic self-positivity biases—regardless of one’s level of 
implicit self-esteem—then implicit self-esteem should not impact name-letter 
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preferences. Thus, examining the role of implicit self-esteem in initial-letter biases was 
one of the aims of the present research, which are discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AIMS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
One of the aims of the current study was to offer a unique paradigm in which the 
name letter effect could be examined in everyday decision-making. Specifically, the 
researcher sought to investigate whether the otherwise subjective experience of humor 
would be influenced by an objective and predictable implicit process, our bias toward our 
name letters. A second aim was to examine two new variables that may influence the 
name letter effect: gender-matching and implicit self-esteem. To this end, and as 
described in the previous chapter, authors such as Pelham, Carvallo, and Jones (2005) 
have raised the question of whether implicit egotism researchers’ observed name letter 
effects might be due to the majority of participants’ good fortune of having unconscious 
favorable self-attitudes, and further underscore the possibility that their typical implicit 
egotism findings “would be reversed among people who possess truly negative self-
associations, i.e., for those with low levels of implicit self-esteem” (Pelham et al., 2005, 
p. 109). Thus, research which seeks to pursue this possibility that typical implicit egotism 
findings could be reversed among individuals with unfavorable implicit self-esteem is 
extremely theoretically worthwhile and will make important contributions to social 
psychology and research on the name letter effect. However, measuring an implicit 
construct such as self-esteem is often tenuous and requires indirect assessment. 
Fortunately, a valid and efficient measure has recently been developed to measure 
implicit self-attitudes.   
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Authors Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer and Maio (2008) examined participants’ 
liking for their entire names instead of individual name letters to devise a single-item 
measure of implicit self-esteem. For this measure, participants are simply asked to 
indicate how much they like their full name using a scale with endpoints of “not at all” to 
“very much.” Comparisons with two widely used measures of implicit self-biases, the 
Self-Esteem IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and the Name Letter Test (Nuttin, 1985; 
1987), found Gebauer et al.’s (2008) single-item measure to be correlated with both of 
these instruments. Name-liking was also highly correlated with two other explicit 
measures of global self-attitudes, including results obtained from quick responses on 
explicit self-esteem indexes and under conditions of high cognitive load.  
Gebauer et al. (2008) argue that name-liking is superior to the NLT as a measure 
of implicit self-esteem because a) more meaning is attached to groups of letters than 
individual letters, b) whole words instead of letters are stored in our memory, c) letter 
order determines the meaning of an object and how it is evaluated, d) there is no other 
attribute or object more closely related to the self than one’s own name, and e) according 
to Gestalt psychology, the whole is generally considered to be greater than the sum of its 
parts. For these reasons, the authors believe that liking of one’s own name is a more 
efficient and valid measure of implicit self-esteem than the Name Letter Test. Moreover, 
this single-item measure addresses some of Buhrmester, Blanton, and Swann’s (2011) 
concerns with the NLT as a valid measure of implicit self-esteem. Namely, unlike the 
NLT, Gebauer et al.’s (2008) measure was correlated with general well-being and explicit 
self-esteem, demonstrated high test-retest reliability, and was not dependent on the order 
of administration of implicit-explicit measures. In addition, name-liking is more likely 
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than preferences for individual name letters to tap autobiographical information, 
addressing yet another one of Buhrmester et al.’s (2011) doubts regarding the validity of 
the NLT as a measure of implicit self-esteem. 
Previously, Hoorens & Nuttin (1993) found differences in name-letter preferences 
were associated with participants’ beliefs that their name a) would suit someone of the 
opposite gender, b) would suit a member of a professional group to which they would 
like to belong, and c) carried a strong likelihood of being chosen as a name for 
themselves if they would have had the opportunity to so choose. Their study provides 
conceptual justification for Gebauer et al.’s (2008) name-liking measure, but stopped 
short of establishing it as a valid measure of implicit self-esteem. Nevertheless, their 
study gives legs to the hypothesis and provides preliminary support that implicit-self 
attitudes—as measured by name-liking—might influence name-letter biases. Currently, 
Gebauer et al.’s (2008) measure and Hoorens and Nuttin’s (1993) findings are just the tip 
of the implicit egotism iceberg. The present study explored the relationship between 
implicit self-esteem and name-letter preferences more deeply by examining—as Pelham 
et al. (2005) suggested—whether typical implicit egotism findings would be reversed 
among those who truly possess negative self-associations, i.e., poor implicit self-esteem. 
Differences in name-letter preferences were examined among participants with high and 
low implicit self-esteem, as measured by Gebauer et al.’s (2008) name-liking instrument. 
Thus, the proposed study sought to a) fill this important gap in implicit egotism 
research by examining the role of implicit self-attitudes in biases toward name letters,    
b) foster a more comprehensive understanding of the self-concept and our resulting self-
biases, and c) contribute theoretically to social psychology and research on implicit 
 22 
 
egotism by challenging the notion that the name letter effects observed in previous 
studies are the result of an overwhelming majority of participants’ good fortune of 
possessing favorable self-attitudes. By measuring implicit self-esteem, the proposed 
study also aimed to determine whether a) positive self-attitudes are the norm for the 
general population, b) one’s level of implicit self-esteem impacts name-letter preferences, 
c) if biases toward name letters occur in general regardless of one’s level of self-esteem, 
and d) if name-letter preferences are synonymous with implicit self-esteem. 
Previous research has also demonstrated that name-letter biases can vary as a 
function of gender, with women demonstrating stronger name letter effects than men for 
their first names (Pelham et al., 2002; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). Therefore, another 
aim of the current study was to examine whether women participants would exhibit 
stronger preferences for captions submitted by writers with whom they shared a first 
name initial and if they would display stronger biases toward their initial letter on the 
NLT.  
Another aim of the present study was to examine the effect of self-concept threats 
on name-letter preferences. Based on Jones et al.’s (2002) and Brendl et al.’s (2005) 
research, it was expected that participants who experienced a minor threat to the self-
concept would exhibit modestly stronger biases compared to those who received a small 
boost to their self-concept. A self-concept threat was expected to serve as a motive for 
participants to self-enhance when given the opportunity to evaluate captions submitted by 
writers who shared their first name initial. Evidence of a name letter effect would support 
implicit egotism as one of our many self-serving biases. Explicit self-esteem, as measured 
by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989), would likely moderate the effect 
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of a self-concept threat. Participants high in explicit self-esteem were expected to 
exhibit stronger name-letter preferences than participants with low explicit self-esteem 
after experiencing the same threat. Born from the well-practiced need to self-enhance, 
preferences for captions submitted by writers with whom participants shared an initial 
letter would provide an opportunity for ordinarily high explicit self-esteem individuals to 
regulate their recently injured self-esteem. 
Krizan and Suls’ (2008) meta-analysis found the accessibility of participants’ self-
attitudes influenced name-letter preferences when explicit self-esteem measures were 
administered immediately prior to versus after the Name Letter Test. Specifically, 
explicit self-esteem measures were found to prime positive self-evaluations before the 
NLT because participants’ self-attitudes became more accessible, resulting in stronger 
biases. The order of the current study’s explicit self-esteem measure would thus be 
manipulated in the same fashion to test for differences in name-letter preferences between 
participants with high and low self-attitude accessibility.  
 A final aim of the proposed study—and representing a “new twist” on implicit 
egotism research—was to examine shared gender as a possible influence on name-letter 
biases. Previous research has found gender-matching effects in the areas of supervisor-
supervisee relationships (Worthington, Jr. & Stern, 1985) and therapist-patient treatment 
outcomes (Zlotnick, Elkin, & Shea, 1998; Sterling, Gottheil, Weinstein & Serota, 1998), 
but gender-matching effects have never before been examined among biases 
demonstrated toward name letters. In a unique task designed to simultaneously measure 
both initial-letter biases and gender-biases, participants would rate cartoon captions 
ostensibly submitted by men and women writers who shared and did not share their first 
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initial. Analysis of participants’ and caption writers’ gender would provide a novel test 
of gender-matching as a potential influence on name-letter preferences and further 
advance the study of implicit egotism with new data. 
In sum, the present study sought to add to the growing body of implicit egotism 
research by examining several influences (gender differences, self-attitude accessibility, 
and self-concept threats) on name-letter biases using a novel paradigm. In addition, two 
new variables were examined as potential influences on name-letter preferences: implicit 
self-esteem and shared gender. A special emphasis was placed on teasing out the role 
implicit self-attitudes play in initial-letter biases to determine if the name letter effect 
reflects a universal and automatic positive self-bias or if it reflects one’s level of implicit 
self-esteem, with typical implicit egotism findings possibly being reversed for 
participants with negative implicit self-attitudes—an important empirical question for 
future research raised by Pelham et al. (2005).  
Hypotheses reflecting the current study’s aims are summarized in Table 1. 
Methods for experimentally manipulating variables will be described in more detail in the 













Two separate identical studies—one recruiting men and one recruiting women— 
were posted simultaneously in Experimetrix, Loyola University Chicago’s web-based 
psychology experiment scheduling portal. Both studies were titled “Judgments of Humor 
and Language in the 21
st
 Century” and were designed to be completed in one hour or less 
as an online experiment. Respondents received one experiment participation credit hour 
for completing the experiment. Recruitment of participants began at the beginning of the 
fifth week of the Fall 2011 semester and lasted 11 weeks. 
Sample 
Participants were 503 men and women enrolled in Psychology 101 at Loyola 
University Chicago. The average weekly number of respondents who signed up for and 
completed the experiment was 45, range = 14 (week 11) to 74 (week 2). An average of 15 
men completed the experiment each week, range = 10 (week 3) to 24 (week 10), while an 
average of 29 women completed the experiment each week, range = 3 (week 11) to 57 
(week 6). For weekly participant recruitment frequencies for men and women, please see 



















Based on the appearance of traditionally feminine first and/or middle names in 
Experimetrix’s participant sign-up list, at least 6 women signed up incorrectly for the 
men’s version of the experiment, while no men incorrectly signed up for the women’s 
version. These estimates, however, could vary when taking into account gender-neutral, 
ethnic, or other types of names. Because respondents’ names could not be associated with 
their surveys, these six women’s data were unable to be removed from the men’s set of 
responses, however, they accounted for less than 4% of what will henceforth be 
considered the (all) men participants. 
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Nine participants’ data were removed because they left their surveys blank 
either due to choice, a technological error, or because they closed the internet window 
during the experiment. Two respondents were excluded because they disagreed to 
participate in the experiment after signing up. The resulting N was 492 participants (324 
women and 168 men).   
Completion Times 
The amount of time participants took to complete the experiment was recorded 
online. On average, respondents spent 16.46 minutes completing the experiment (range = 
2–624 minutes, SD = 35.76). Fourteen cases were excluded from this average because 
they did not finish the experiment, thus a completion time was not recorded. Men (N = 
166) on average spent 14.32 minutes completing the experiment (range = 2–198 minutes, 
SD = 17.06), while women (N = 312) on average spent 17.61 minutes (range = 4–624 
minutes, SD = 42.46). Even though women on average spent more than 3 minutes longer 
than men completing the experiment, this difference was not statistically significant, 
t(476) = .96, p = .34, d = .10. 
Immediately, the minimum and maximum completion times suggest, respectively, 
that some participants might not have complied with the instructions for parts or all of the 
experiment, while others might not have relied on their gut feelings when instructed to do 
so. It is also possible that respondents with longer completion times might have 
suspended their participation and returned to the experiment at a later time. As with all 
completion times, it is impossible to say which parts of the survey could have been 




Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality for the distribution 
of completion times were both significant, p < .001. Exclusion of outliers based on three 
or more standard deviations was not instructive. Because the experiment was designed to 
be completed well within a one-hour time frame, cases where participants took longer 
than one hour to finish the experiment (N = 10, 2.1%) were considered to be potential 
outliers on the completion time variable. Previous researchers, however, have refrained 
from using long completion times as an exclusionary criterion, arguing that their survey 
program did not record completion times for individual pages so it would be impossible 
to determine on which part(s) respondents lingered, if they simply opened the survey but 
began it at a another time, or if they began the survey and returned to it at a later time 
(Nosen & Woody, 2008). It is worth mention that no participants contacted the 
experimenter to request additional participation credit hours or to complain that the 
experiment took longer than the projected (maximum) time of one hour. 
Short completion times raise similar concerns as to whether respondents 
conscientiously completed the experiment. Twenty-nine participants (6.1%) had 
completion times of less than 7 minutes, which fell under the 10
th
 percentile in the 
distribution of respondent completion times. It is unclear as to whether meaningful 
participation could occur with experiment completion times under 7 minutes. However, 
because name-letter preferences reflect an automatic and highly efficient unconscious 
process, shorter experiment completion times are not particularly troubling. 
As a precaution, the researcher took a conservative approach and analyzed 
experiment data both including and excluding data from participants with long and short 
completion times. Fortunately, results were extremely similar and often identical, 
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regardless of the amount of time respondents spent completing the experiment. Thus, 
results reported reflect data from the entire set of participants (N = 492). 
Procedure 
 At the time of sign-up in Experimetrix, a hyperlink to the web study was 
displayed to participants so they could click on and begin the experiment. The study 
could be completed online using an internet connection from respondents’ home 
computers, or if desired, from a campus computer. Experimetrix parameters were set so 
that respondents could only sign up for the experiment once and participation in either the 
men’s or women’s version of the web study precluded eligibility for participation in the 
women’s or men’s version, respectively.  
 The format of the experiment was developed in Opinio, a widely-used and 
Loyola-endorsed web research software tool. Loyola’s Office of Research Services 
(ORS) and Information Technology Services (ITS) departments have worked in tandem 
with Opinio to create specifications that secure participants’ anonymity and the data they 
enter according to the highest security standards possible. Data transmitted from 
respondents’ computers are encrypted and stored on the Opinio server, which is protected 
inside Loyola’s perimeter firewall. Participants’ IP addresses were hidden from the 
researcher. 
 The ITS department was able to build a randomization process into the survey 
link provided to participants upon sign-up for the experiment. Clicking on the same web 
URL randomly directed men respondents to one of 24 different surveys, which featured 
slight differences in the order of measures and contained one of three self-concept threat 
conditions. A different web URL was provided to women participants who signed up for 
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the experiment, which also randomly directed them to one of 24 different surveys 
featuring the same slight differences in the order of measures and contained one of three 
of the men’s same threat conditions. Again, men and women participants’ experiments 
were identical in content, orders of measures, and threat conditions, but were listed 
separately as a means to merely eliminate the need to ask respondents to indicate their 
gender within the survey. 
 Participants completed the online experiment anonymously, with the exception of 
the identifying information of gender (determined by the version of the study they signed 
up for) and their first initial (which was queried in a survey question). No other 
identifying information was requested or collected from respondents. 
Informed Consent 
 On the first webpage of the survey, participants were given information about the 
nature, purpose, and type of questions that were included in the experiment. The consent 
process adhered to guidelines set forth by Loyola University Chicago’s Institutional 
Review Board for web-based research and used Loyola’s General Consent Form 
Template. Elements included a confidentiality disclaimer, information regarding 
participants’ anonymity, contact information for the primary investigator and faculty 
sponsor, and respondents’ inability to retrieve or discard responses from the database 
once submitted. Participation throughout the duration of the experiment was entirely 
voluntary and respondents were free to refrain from answering any question(s) for any 
reason or discontinue their participation in the study without penalty. Results of the study 





Humor Consumption Survey 
All respondents who consented to participate in the experiment first completed a 
two-item survey which measured their exposure to cartoons and other humorous media. 
Participants were asked to indicate how often they read cartoons in newspapers or 
magazines and how often they watched humorous television shows or movies using the 
provided scale of 1) every day, 2) once a week, 3) once a month, 4) a few times a year, 
and 5) almost never. The purpose of this survey was to help disguise the study’s 
hypotheses and to help frame the experiment as a study of humor and language. 
Self-Esteem Threat Manipulation 
 Following an experimental manipulation used by Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, and 
Mirenberg (2002), participants were randomly assigned to surveys containing one of 
three conditions: a self-concept threat, affirmation, or control writing task. In the self-
concept threat condition, respondents were asked to write at least three sentences about 
an aspect of themselves that they have found difficult to change, but would like to be 
different. Participants in the self-concept affirmation condition were asked to write at 
least three sentences about an important area of their lives in which they have always felt 
good about themselves and represented a positive, important, and stable aspect of who 
they are. Finally, respondents in the control condition were simply asked to write at least 
three sentences about the last movie they saw. The purpose of this component of the 
experiment was to deliver a mild threat to participants’ self-concept and compare their 





 Subsequent to the self-concept threat, affirmation, or control manipulation, all 
participants were asked to complete a brief mood questionnaire to ensure that observed 
differences in initial-letter biases could be attributable to the threat manipulation, instead 
of due to a manipulation of mood. The questionnaire was identical to the one used by 
Jones et al. (2002) for this same purpose and consisted of two items which asked 
respondents to indicate their current mood and how they were feeling at the current 
moment using the scale of 1) extremely sad to 7) extremely happy. 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
 Next, one-half of participants were randomly assigned to complete the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989), a brief widely-used measure of self-reported 
(“explicit”) self-esteem. It consists of 10 items which assess general self-value and self-
worth. The remaining half of participants completed the measure at the end of the study 
as a means to vary self-attitude accessibility and to examine its impact on initial-letter 
biases. Please see Appendix A for the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). 
Initial-Letter Biases 
 Participants were next shown two randomly-selected cartoons licensed from The 
New Yorker magazine’s “cartoon caption contest” collection, along with 20 different 
possible captions for each cartoon. More than one million people have entered their 
caption submissions for the over 300 contests the magazine has held since the 
competition was first introduced in 2005. All of the several thousand captions submitted 
for each weekly contest are publicly viewable online, however the identity of caption 
writers are kept anonymous. Names of caption writers are only included with their 
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submissions when they are selected as one of three finalists by the cartoon editorial 
staff for each week’s cartoon. The public then votes on the top three entries, and based on 
these votes, a winner is chosen. As a “mock” version of the magazine’s cartoon caption 
contest, participants were asked to play the role of a “judge” and evaluate 20 captions 
provided for each of the two cartoons (40 captions in total). 
 Captions for the cartoons were selected from the thousands of submissions posted 
online according to the following criteria: a) they referenced the juxtaposition of the two 
opposing elements featured in the cartoon, b) they were grammatically and semantically 
correct, and c) they were short in length, i.e., approximately 10–12 words. While the 
humor and interpretation of each caption would be largely subjective, adhering to the 
above criteria ensured that a) the captions resembled typical cartoon captions, b) they 
could be read quickly, and c) they were brief enough to allow participants to compare 
multiple captions when assigning ratings, if desired. Respondents were asked to 
individually and quickly rate each set of 20 captions using the scale of 1) not at all 
humorous to 7) extremely humorous, while using their “gut feelings.”  
Importantly, fictitious caption writers’ names were referred to as “students who 
submitted each caption,” with caption writers’ names printed in bold beside each caption. 
Emboldening the names served to highlight the writers’ names, while placing the names 
in a prominent position, i.e., “flush left” and preceding each caption, helped to further 
emphasize and draw attention to writers’ names while participants were evaluating 
captions and making their ratings. These methods were used in a concerted effort to help 
ensure that participants attended to caption writers’ names. However, because previous 
researchers have found name letter effects even when using subliminal (13.7 millisecond) 
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name-letter targets (Jones et al., 2004), whether participants attended to name-letter 
stimuli in the current study was not an immediate concern. 
Each caption was randomly assigned a fictitious “submitted by” name that began 
with a different letter of the alphabet, with the exception of the letters O, Q, U, X, Y, and 
Z. These six letters were omitted because a) they are the rarest first name initials 
according to recent Census data (census.gov/genealogy/names/), b) asking participants to 
rate 26 captions might have revealed the hypotheses of the study, c) including all 26 
letters would have increased the length of the task and experiment, while d) requiring 
participants to rate a large, uncommon, and potentially unwieldy number of items. The 
caption-rating task was a unique method designed to simultaneously allow measurement 
of name-letter preferences while also manipulating the gender of caption writers. In this 
way, the current investigation became the first implicit egotism study to examine both 
types of biases in tandem. 
Arrangement of captions could not be completely randomized using the survey 
software technology, so instead participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
cartoon caption order presentations: forward order for Cartoons 1 and 2; forward order 
for Cartoon 1 and backward order for Cartoon 2; backward order for Cartoon 1 and 
forward order for Cartoon 2; and backward order for Cartoons 1 and 2. Within these 
caption arrangements, the first letter of caption writers’ names (one name each for the 
letters A–Z, with the exceptions of O, Q, U, X, Y, and Z) were randomly positioned for 
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2. Gender of fictitious caption writers (10 men and 10 women), 
were randomly assigned for Cartoon 1, with the opposite gender assigned to that initial-
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letter for Cartoon 2. Please refer to Appendix B for the two cartoons used in the study, 
with sets of captions presented in “forward” arrangement order for both cartoons. 
Hypothesis Awareness Questionnaire 
After the caption-rating exercise, respondents completed an “influences on humor 
judgments” questionnaire as a test of hypothesis awareness. The questionnaire probed 
whether participants were aware of any role the similarity between their names and the 
caption writers’ might have played in their caption preferences and ratings. Respondents 
were asked to indicate anything that might have influenced their humor ratings in the 
preceding task by choosing one or more of the following variables: the cleverness of the 
caption’s language; the caption writer’s interpretation of the drawing; their individual 
sense of humor; the number of cartoons they read per week; the number of humorous 
television shows or films they watch per week; and a variable marked “other,” along with 
text space to type in a potential influence that was not already listed. 
Name Letter Test 
Next, respondents completed the traditional Name Letter Test (NLT), which was 
described as a survey of “aesthetic judgments of lexical stimuli.” Because letter order 
could not be randomized for each participant, letters were displayed in one random fixed 
order for all respondents. Participants were asked to estimate how beautiful they found 
each of the 26 letters of the alphabet using their “gut feelings.” It was explained that even 
though it might seem unusual to evaluate letters in terms of their beauty, previous 
research studying these types of evaluations has fostered “a better understanding of 




Implicit Self-Esteem Measure 
After the NLT, participants completed Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, and Maio’s 
(2008) single-item measure of implicit self-esteem. This measure asks respondents to 
simply indicate how much they like their full name in total (including their first and last 
name together) using the scale 1) not at all to 7) very much. It was purposely 
administered after the humor judgments exercise and NLT so as not to raise participants’ 
suspicion that their name might play a role in or otherwise influence their preferences for 
cartoon captions and evaluations of alphabet letters. 
Self-Attitude Accessibility 
Finally, to conclude the experiment, the remaining half of participants randomly 
assigned to the “low self-attitude accessibility” condition completed the RSES at this 
time. The other half of respondents who were randomly assigned to the “high self-attitude 
accessibility” condition had already completed this portion of the experiment prior to the 
humor judgments exercise. For participants in the “high self-attitude accessibility” 
condition, the experiment concluded after they completed the single-item implicit self-
esteem measure described above. The experiment concluded for the “low self-attitude 
accessibility” participants upon completion of the RSES.   
Debriefing 
All respondents were debriefed at the end of the experiment and were given 
additional information about the study’s purpose, which was described as an investigation 
of self-related biases in humor judgments and aesthetic evaluations of letters of the 
alphabet. The debriefing statement explained that although some judgments and 
evaluations are often largely subjective, research on implicit egotism has shown that 
 38 
 
people sometimes make both everyday and important decisions based on their 
preferences for self-related attributes, including one’s name letters.  
Respondents were made aware of the different experimental conditions to which 
they were randomly assigned. It was explained that these conditions consisted of 
measures developed to assess self-esteem and contained tasks designed to briefly deliver 
a mild threat or affirmation to their self-concept, or a control condition. Hypotheses 
underlying these manipulations were offered and participants were urged to refrain from 
discussing the experiment with other students. 
Participants interested in learning more about implicit egotism were provided with 
a brief introductory-level journal article on the topic, which was accessible from Loyola 
University Chicago’s e-journal database. They were also given email addresses for the 
Primary Investigator and her Faculty Sponsor, should they have any complaints, 









Respondents were first asked about their frequency of humor consumption in 
order to frame the study as one assessing judgments of humor and to help disguise the 
hypotheses of the experiment. All participants (N = 492) indicated how often they read 
cartoons in newspapers or magazines by choosing one of the following responses: every 
day (N = 11), once a week (N = 86), once a month (N = 105), a few times a year (N = 
136), or almost never (N = 154).  
Next, participants indicated how often they watched humorous television shows 
or movies by choosing from the same set of responses: every day (N = 165), once a week 
(N = 264), once a month (N = 45), a few times a year (N = 13), or almost never (N = 5). 
Although respondents’ consumption of humor was not of particular interest to this study 
and the purpose of these two questions was merely to “frame” the study as one examining 
judgments of humor, reported vs. expected frequencies of reading cartoons and watching 
humorous television shows or movies were significantly different, !2 = 26.71, df = 16,    
p < .05, which is considered a small- to medium-sized effect, w
2
 = .05 (Cohen, 1988). 
Hypothesis Awareness 
The researcher probed for hypothesis awareness after participants completed the 
humor judgments exercise. Respondents were asked to choose one or more variables that 
might have influenced their caption ratings from the following list: the cleverness of the
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captions’ language, the caption writers’ interpretations of the drawing, the participant’s 
individual sense of humor, the number of cartoons he or she typically reads per week, and 
the number of humorous television shows or films watched per week, along with an 
“other” variable. If “other” was selected, respondents were asked to describe any 
additional variables that might have influenced their ratings that were not already listed. 
A blank text field was provided for respondents to list these additional variables.   
 Participants’ individual sense of humor was the most frequently chosen variable 
as a possible influence on their previous cartoon caption ratings (N = 424), followed by 
the cleverness of the captions’ language (N = 395), the caption writers’ interpretations of 
the drawing (N = 297), and the number of humorous television shows or films 
respondents watched per week (N = 55). The number of cartoons participants read per 
week (N = 22) and “other” (N = 22) were the least frequently chosen influences. Analysis 
of “other” variables provided by respondents revealed neither an awareness of shared 
initials with caption writers as a possible influence on their caption ratings, nor any of the 
study’s other hypotheses. Responses when indicated (N = 21) included variables such as 
“puns,” the “caption writer’s originality,” “irony,” and the “ability to use common 
language to create a joke.” Based on respondents’ lack of awareness of the potential role 
shared initials with caption writers might have played in their judgments of humor, the 
researcher can conclude that a) the hypotheses of the experiment were not known or 
discovered by participants and b) any preferences that emerged toward initial-letter 




PRIMARY ANALYSES OF INITIAL-LETTER BIASES 
 
The Name Letter Test 
Initial-letter biases on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were computed using an 
ipsatized scoring algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 
2004), which is a conservative approach to computing name-letter preferences because it 
double-corrects name-letter ratings at both the individual level and at the group level. 
First, the mean rating a participant assigned to all non-initial letters is subtracted from 
each of his or her letter ratings, including his or her initial letter. Next, normative letter 
baseline ratings for each letter are calculated by averaging the ipsatized letter ratings 
assigned by participants who did not have the letter as an initial. The final step involves 
subtracting the normative ipsatized baseline rating for a participant’s initial letter from 
their ipsatized rating of that letter to obtain his or her “initial-letter bias.” SPSS syntax for 
computing initial-letter biases with the I-algorithm (along with other algorithms) was 
obtained from Dr. LeBel’s University of Western Ontario research website (2011). 
Computations were randomly and manually confirmed for accuracy, and were also 
confirmed exhaustively with Microsoft Excel.  
For example, 420 participants rated the letter “A” from 1) not at all beautiful to 
(7) extremely beautiful. Of these, 55 participants’ first initial was “A,” so normative 
baselines were derived from the average of the 365 remaining non-initial matching 
participants’ ipsatized ratings for the letter “A.” Then, this normative ipsatized baseline 
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rating for the letter “A” was subtracted from each participant’s ipsatized rating for the 
letter “A” whose name began with that letter, with the result yielding their “initial-letter 
bias.” Please see Table 3 for a list of normative ipsatized baseline ratings, mean ipsatized 
ratings by initial-matching participants, and mean initial-letter biases for all 26 letters of 
the alphabet.   
 Out of the 492 total respondents, 420 (150 men and 270 women) provided their 
first initial for their first given name and had non-missing and non-redundant letter 
ratings on the Name Letter Test (NLT). Using the I-algorithm, results showed that 
participants displayed a very strong bias toward their own initial letters. The average 
difference between participants’ ipsatized ratings for their initial-letter and the normative 
ipsatized baseline value for that letter was +1.38 (range = –3.43–6.05, SD = 1.63), which 
was statistically significant, t(419) = 17.28, p < .001. This effect is considered large, d = 
.84, and is consistent with the medium to large effects found in recent studies on the 
name letter effect (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009). In sum, when it came to rating one’s first 
initial letter on the NLT, participants increased their ratings an average of 1.38 points on 
the 1) not at all beautiful to 7) extremely beautiful scale, relative to their average rating 
for non-initials and the corresponding normative ipsatized baseline rating for their initial.     
Inspection of individual NLT scores that were three standard deviations below the 
mean (scores less than or equal to –3.52) and three standard deviations above the mean 
(scores greater than or equal to +6.27) produced no outliers. Examination of Tukey box 
plots, however, identified two potential outliers—one with an NLT score of –3.43 and 






letter bias of +1.38 (range = –2.83–5.64, SD = 1.60), which was also again significant 
t(417) = 17.56, p < .001, d = 86. Because excluding these two respondents’ data 
produced identical results, all participants were included in subsequent NLT analyses. 
Initial-Letter Biases in Humor Judgments 
Cartoon 1 
Biases toward captions written by writers who shared participants’ first initials 
were computed in the same manner as initial-letter biases on the NLT, i.e., using the I-
algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). Results are 
based on data from respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for the entire 
set of twenty Cartoon 1 captions, and those whose initial letter matched one of the twenty 
caption writers’ initials (N = 428).  
The average initial-letter bias exhibited toward captions was +.18 (range = –3.46–
5.09, SD = 1.59). When it came to judging captions written by writers with whom 
participants shared a first initial, respondents on average increased their ratings by almost 
two-tenths of a point on the 1) not at all humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale, 
relative to ratings of captions written by non-initial matching writers and as compared to 
normative ipsatized baseline caption ratings. While this observed initial-letter bias was 
significant, t(427) = 2.35, p = .02 (two-tailed), the effect was small, d = .11. For a list of 
normative ipsatized baselines, mean ipsatized ratings by initial-matching participants, and 
mean initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 captions, please refer to Table 4. 
Cartoon 2 
Biases toward captions written by writers who shared respondents’ first initials 
were again computed using the I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, 
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& Packer, 2004). Results are based on participants with complete and non-redundant 
ratings for the entire set of twenty Cartoon 2 captions and those whose initial letter 





The average bias exhibited toward Cartoon 2 captions was +.10 (range = –
3.81–4.47, SD = 1.48). When it came to rating captions written by writers with whom 
participants shared a first initial, respondents on average increased their ratings by one-
tenth of a point on the 1) not at all humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale, relative to 
their ratings of captions written by non-initial matching writers and as compared to 
normative ipsatized baseline ratings. While in the predicted direction, this bias did not 
reach statistical significance, t(428) = 1.35, p = .18 (two-tailed), d = .07. For a list of 
normative ipsatized baselines, mean ipsatized ratings by initial-matching participants, and 
mean initial-letter biases for Cartoon 2 captions, please refer to Table 5. 
Both Cartoons 
Participants demonstrated a statistically significant bias toward Cartoon 1 
captions submitted by writers with whom they shared an initial letter. A similar effect 
was observed for Cartoon 2 captions, however this bias failed to reach statistical 
significance. After considering caption ratings for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 separately, 
initial-letter biases were averaged together across both sets of captions. Data from 
respondents who shared an initial with caption writers and who had complete and non-
redundant caption ratings for both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 were included in analyses   
(N = 394). Participants’ average initial-letter biases were computed by the I-algorithm 
(LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). 
The average bias exhibited across both sets of captions was +.15 (range = –2.46–
3.12, SD = 1.08). When it came to judging captions written by writers with whom 
participants shared a first initial, respondents on average increased their ratings by .15 










ratings of captions written by non-initial matching writers and as compared to 
normative ipsatized baseline ratings. When biases were averaged together for Cartoon 1 
and Cartoon 2, biases exhibited toward captions written by same-initial writers were 
statistically significant, t(393) = 2.67, p = .01 (two-tailed). This effect, however, is 
considered small, d = .14. 
Nickname Initial-Letter Biases 
At the conclusion of the experiment, respondents were asked to indicate the first 
initial letter of their first given name for use in name-letter preferences analyses. Because 
people oftentimes “go by” a name other than their first given name, participants were 
asked to indicate if that was the case, and if so, what the first initial of that name was. Of 
the 492 participants, 62 indicated that they “went by” another name with a different 
initial than their first given name, while 403 respondents confirmed that the name they 
“went by” began with the initial letter they already indicated for their first given name.   
Twenty-seven respondents did not answer this “nickname” question, either 
because they discontinued the experiment prematurely or because they chose not to 
respond to this item. The purpose of the follow-up nickname question was to confirm that 
participants indeed “went by” their first given name initial in order to accurately identify 
the target of bias for name-letter preferences analyses. In so doing, an opportunity was 
presented to examine nickname initial biases separately and as distinct from first given 
name initial biases, becoming the first implicit egotism study to pursue this 





The Name Letter Test (Nickname Initial) 
 Nickname-initial analyses were based on 58 respondents who reported a 
nickname initial and had complete, non-redundant letter ratings on the NLT. Biases for 
nickname analyses were computed using the I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; 
Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). The average NLT bias based on participants’ 
nickname initial was +.36 (range = –3.61–3.72, SD = 1.76). When it came to rating 
nickname initial letters, participants on average increased their ratings by over one-third 
of a point on the 1) not at all beautiful to 7) extremely beautiful scale, relative to their 
ratings of non-nickname initials and as compared to normative ipsatized baseline ratings. 
This bias, however, did not reach significance, t(57) = 1.55, p = .13 (two-tailed), and the 
effect was small, d = .20. 
Cartoon 1 (Nickname Initial) 
Initial-letter biases for participants with nicknames were also computed using the 
I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). Analyses 
were based on 51 respondents who reported a nickname initial and had complete, non-
redundant caption ratings for Cartoon 1. The average nickname initial bias exhibited was 
–.38 (range = –3.78–3.80, SD = 1.81). Interestingly, when it came to rating captions 
submitted by writers who shared participants’ nickname initial, respondents on average 
decreased their ratings by over one-third of a point on the 1) not at all humorous to 7) 
extremely humorous scale, relative to their ratings of captions written by non-nickname 
initial writers and as compared to normative ipsatized baseline ratings. This (negative) 
bias exhibited toward nickname-initial caption writers was in the opposite direction 
predicted and was nonsignificant, t(50) = –1.52, p = .14 (two-tailed), d = –.20.    
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Cartoon 2 (Nickname Initial) 
Initial-letter biases for participants with nicknames were again computed using 
the I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). Analyses 
were based on 49 respondents who reported a nickname initial and had complete, non-
redundant caption ratings for Cartoon 2. The average nickname initial-letter bias 
exhibited by participants was –.08 (range = –3.58–3.02, SD = 1.30). Consistent with the 
negative biases observed toward Cartoon 1 nickname-initial writers’ captions, 
participants again on average decreased their ratings by nearly one-tenth of a point on the 
1) not at all humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale, relative to their ratings of captions 
written by non-nickname initial writers and as compared to normative baseline ratings. 
Again, this negative bias was opposite to the direction predicted and nonsignificant, t(48) 
= –.41, p = .68 (two-tailed), d = –.06.  
Both Cartoons (Nickname Initial) 
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases were again negative when 
averaged together across both sets of cartoon caption ratings (N = 45, M = –.30, range =  
–3.30–1.98, SD = 1.03). This effect was opposite to the direction predicted and, 
interestingly, was actually significant, t(44) = –1.98, p = .05 (two-tailed), d = –.29.  
“Pure” First Given Name Letter Biases 
Savvy readers will have noted that previous analyses of initial-letter preferences 
reflected biases toward first given name initials, irrespective of the name respondents 
reported they “went by.” After separating participants who indicated they “went by” 
another name with a different initial letter in their own analysis (see preceding 
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“nickname” analyses), the researcher next re-analyzed the original initial-letter 
preference scores excluding participants who went by a different or “nickname” initial 
letter.  
This was done for two reasons. First, initial-letter biases were vastly different 
between these two samples. Secondly, the original larger analysis examined first given 
name initial-letter biases among respondents who did and did not go by a name that 
began with this target letter. Therefore, nicknamed participants were excluded in a 
follow-up analysis to determine whether a “pure” subset of respondents who indeed went 
by their first given name would demonstrate even stronger biases when data was not 
muddled by noise from nicknamed participants.   
The Name Letter Test (NLT) 
Out of the 420 participants in the original NLT analysis, 58 respondents were 
excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was different from 
that of their first given name. Twelve additional participants were excluded because they 
did not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial. A follow-up analysis 
of NLT biases toward respondent-confirmed first given name initials included 350 
participants.   
The average initial-letter bias was +1.42 for this subset of respondents (range =    
–2.83–6.05, SD = 1.61). When it came to ratings of participants’ first initials for their 
first given name, participants rated that initial letter 1.42 points higher on the 
attractiveness scale, relative to non-initials and as compared to normative baselines. This 
observed bias was significant, t(349) = 16.44, p < .001, and the effect is considered large, 
d = .88. Recall that this bias is very similar to the one demonstrated by the larger set of 
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respondents (N = 420), which was based on first given name initial targets of 
participants who both went by their first given name and those who went by a different 
name that began with a different letter, +1.38 (range = –3.43–6.05, SD = 1.63), t(419) = 
17.28, p < .001, d = .84. Based on previous and follow-up analyses of NLT scores, one 
can argue that initial-letter biases are relevant to first given name initials only, even when 
a person “goes by” another name beginning with a different letter. 
Cartoon 1 
Follow-up analyses of Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases were also conducted to 
determine whether a “pure” subset of participants who indeed “went by” their first given 
name (and the target initial used in the computation of previous initial-letter biases) 
would demonstrate these biases after excluding respondents who went by a name other 
than their first given one (and thus a different target initial that was used in the analysis). 
Out of the 428 participants in the original Cartoon 1 analysis, 54 respondents were 
excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was different from 
their first given name. Thirteen additional participants were excluded because they did 
not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial. Follow-up analyses of 
Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases included 361 respondents who confirmed that they “went 
by” their first given name.   
The average initial-letter bias exhibited by this subset of participants was +.16 
(range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.61). When it came to rating captions submitted by writers 
who shared their first initial of their first given name, respondents rated that caption .16 
points higher on the humor scale, relative to captions submitted by writers who did not 
share their first given name initial and as compared to normative baselines. This finding 
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was marginally significant, t(360) = 1.89, p = .06 (two-tailed) and the effect is 
considered very small, d = .10. Recall that these results were similar in findings for the 
larger set of participants, which included those who both went by their first given name 
and those who went by a nickname (N = 428). Their average initial-letter bias was +.18 
(range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.59), which was significant, t(427) = 2.35, p = .02 (two-
tailed) and effect sizes for both samples were small and nearly identical, d = .11. Based 
on previous and follow-up analyses of Cartoon 1 caption ratings, one can again argue that 
initial-letter biases are relevant to first given name initials only—even when a person 
“goes by” another name beginning with a different letter. 
Cartoon 2 
Out of the 429 participants from the original Cartoon 2 analysis, 53 respondents 
were excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was different 
from their first given name. Twelve additional participants were excluded because they 
did not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial. Follow-up analyses 
of Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases based on respondent-confirmed first given name initials 
included 364 participants who indicated they “went by” their first given name.   
The new average initial-letter bias was +.13 (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.50). 
When it came to rating captions submitted by writers who shared their first initial of their 
first given name, participants rated that caption .13 points higher on the humor scale 
relative to captions submitted by writers who did not share their first given name initial, 
and as compared to normative baselines. This finding, although in the direction predicted, 
did not reach statistical significance, t(363) = 1.66, p = .10 (two-tailed), d = .09. Recall 
that these results are similar in findings to those found among the larger set of 
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participants (N = 429), which examined biases toward initials for respondents who 
both went by their first given name and those who went by a nickname, +.10 (range = –
3.81–4.47, SD = 1.48), t(428) = 1.35, p = .18, two-tailed, d = .07.  
Based on previous and follow-up analyses of Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases (and 
although nonsignificant), one can again argue that these biases were relevant to first 
given name initials only, even when a person “went by” another name beginning with a 
different letter. 
Both Cartoons 
This follow-up analysis was based on 333 respondents who indicated that they 
“went by” their first given name. Out of the 394 participants from the original analysis, 
49 were excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was 
different from their first given name. Twelve additional respondents were excluded 
because they did not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial letter.  
The average initial-letter bias for this subset of participants was +.15 (range = –
2.19–3.12, SD = 1.09). When it came to rating captions submitted by writers who shared 
their first initial of their first given name, respondents rated that caption .15 points higher 
on the humor scale, relative to captions submitted by writers who did not share their first 
given name initial and as compared to normative baseline ratings. This observed bias was 
significant, t(332) = 2.47, p = .01 (two-tailed), d = .14. Recall that this bias was identical 
to the first given name initial-letter bias exhibited by the larger sample of participants (N 
= 394), which included those who went by their first given name, as well as those who 
went by a nickname (M = +.15, range = –2.46–3.12, SD = 1.08). This original initial-
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letter bias was also statistically significant, t(393) = 2.67, p = .01 (two-tailed), and the 
magnitude of the effect was identical, d = .14. 
In sum, based on previous and follow-up analyses of biases exhibited on the NLT, 
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 (individually and when averaged together), the findings of this 
study suggest that initial-letter biases are relevant to first given name initials only, even 
when a person “goes by” another name beginning with a different initial. Moreover, 
biases toward nickname initials were reduced and nonsignificant on the NLT, and were 
negative on the cartoon caption rating task (which were statistically significant when 
averaged together for Cartoon 1 and 2). 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM AND SELF-CONCEPT THREAT CONDITIONS 
Explicit self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES; Rosenberg, 1989), a widely used ten-item self-report index that assesses 
respondents’ overall level of self-value and self-worth. Both the timing of the RSES 
administration and its scores were examined in relation to initial-letter preferences. For 
the 474 participants who completed all ten items on the RSES, the average score was 
20.72 (range = 5–30, SD = 5.02), based on a total possible score of 30 with 3 points for 
each question. Half of the items (#1, #3, #4, #7, and #10) are scored as follows: “strongly 
agree” = 3 points, “agree” = 2 points, “disagree” = 1 point, and “strongly disagree” = 0 
points. The remaining half of items (#2, #5, #6, #8, and #9) are reversed in valence and 
scored as: “strongly agree” = 0 points, “agree” = 1 point, “disagree” = 2 points, and 
“strongly disagree” = 3 points. For a list of RSES items, please refer to Appendix A. 
Explicit Self-Esteem Gender Differences 
For men (N = 161), the average RSES score was 21.22 (range = 7–30, SD = 4.94) 
and for women (N = 313), the average score was 20.47 (range = 5–30, SD = 5.05).  
Differences in men’s and women’s explicit self-esteem were not statistically significant, 





Explicit Self-Esteem and Initial-Letter Biases 
The influence of explicit self-esteem on initial-letter biases was next examined as 
a continuous variable (total score on the RSES) for those with complete data on this 
measure. First, initial-letter biases demonstrated on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were 
regressed on RSES scores. 
The Name Letter Test 
Explicit self-esteem, as measured by RSES scores, did not predict differences in 
NLT biases based on first given name initials, R
2
 = .001, F(1, 408) = .34, p = .56. It also 
failed to predict NLT biases in analyses based on nickname initials, R
2
 = .002, F(1, 55) = 
.13, p = .72.  
Cartoon Caption Ratings 
When initial-letter preferences for Cartoon 1 were regressed on RSES scores, 
explicit self-esteem approached significance as a predictor of biases exhibited toward 
captions written by writers who shared participants’ first given name initial, R
2
 = .01, 
F(1, 417) = 3.26, p = .07. Explicit self-esteem was not a significant predictor of Cartoon 
1 initial-letter biases when analyses were based on respondents’ nickname initial, R
2
 = 
.01, F(1, 48) = .28, p = .60.  
Cartoon 2 initial-letter preference scores were also regressed on RSES scores, but 
explicit self-esteem—as measured by total RSES scores—did not predict biases exhibited 
toward captions written by writers who shared participants’ first given name initial, R
2
 = 
.003, F(1, 419) = 1.22, p = .27, or nickname initial, R
2
 = .03, F(1, 47) = 1.49, p = .23.  
When initial-letter biases were averaged together for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2, 
explicit self-esteem was not a significant predictor of biases demonstrated toward 
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captions submitted by writers who shared respondents’ first given name initials, 
however, it did approach significance, R
2
 = .01, F(1, 385) = 3.33, p = .07. Explicit self-
esteem did not predict average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases when 
analyses were based on participants’ nickname initial, R
2
 = .03, F(1, 43) = 1.27, p = .26. 
Threat Condition Manipulation Check 
A total of 492 men and women respondents were randomly assigned to complete 
a brief writing task in one of three different experimental conditions: self-concept threat   
(N = 158); self-concept affirmation (N = 163); or a control condition (N = 171). The 
researcher evaluated participants’ responses to the writing task in the three different 
threat conditions according to a) the number of sentences written, b) whether they 
followed directions, and c) whether they provided complete responses. 
Recall that following Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Hetts (2002), participants 
who were randomly assigned to the self-concept threat condition were asked to write at 
least three sentences about an aspect of themselves that they have found difficult to 
change and would like to be different. The aspect should have reflected something 
important about themselves that they wished they could change, but have not been able 
to. In the self-concept affirmation condition, respondents were asked to write at least 
three sentences about an important area of their life where they have always felt good 
about themselves, which represents a positive, important, and stable aspect of who they 
are. Finally, participants randomly assigned to the control condition were asked to simply 
write at least three sentences about the last movie they saw. 
On average, respondents wrote 3.19 sentences (range = 1–7, SD = .67), based on 
486 participants who completed the writing task for one of the three experimental 
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conditions. Of these, 469 participants wrote at least three sentences as instructed, 10 
wrote only two sentences, and 7 respondents wrote just one sentence. Further analysis of 
the content of responses revealed that 461 participants wrote at least three sentences that 
were relevant to the threat condition to which they were assigned, 17 participants wrote 
less than three relevant and complete sentences, 4 did not follow the instructions
1
 and 
another 4 respondents had misaligned or duplicate data. Only those participants who 
followed directions by writing at least three sentences on a topic relevant to the 
experimental condition to which they were assigned were included in self-concept threat 
analyses (N = 461).  
A one-way ANOVA was performed to determine whether the number of 
sentences respondents wrote significantly differed between the experimental conditions. 
Participants randomly assigned to the self-concept threat condition (N = 143) wrote an 
average of 3.20 sentences (SD = .51). Those randomly assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 154) wrote an almost identical number of sentences (M = 3.19, 
SD = .59), while participants randomly assigned to the control condition (N = 164) wrote 
an average of 3.32 sentences (SD = .67). Differences in the average number of sentences 
written among the three threat conditions approached significance, F(2, 458) = 2.66, p = 
.07, !
2
 = .01, with participants in the control condition (who were asked to write about a 




"!All 4 of these participants were in the self-concept threat condition and instead of writing about a 
personal flaw, they either a) put a positive spin on a shortcoming or b) indicated that there was nothing 
about themselves that they wished to change. Neither of these outcomes represented a threat to the self-
concept, and thus these respondents’ data were not included in threat analyses.!
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Subsequent to the writing task, respondents were asked to rate their current 
mood and how they were feeling at the present moment using a scale from 1) extremely 
negative to 7) extremely positive (Jones et al., 2002). Two participants did not answer 
both questions, so they were excluded from analyses. The average rating given by 
participants across conditions was 4.92 for self-assessments of current mood (N = 459, 
range = 1–7, SD = 1.08) and 4.72 for self-assessments of how they were currently feeling 
(N = 459, range = 1–7, SD = 1.15).  
On average, participants who were randomly assigned to the self-concept threat 
condition and completed the mood item (N = 142) rated their current mood a 4.80 (range 
= 1–7, SD = 1.13). Those assigned to the self-concept affirmation condition (N = 154) 
rated their current mood a 4.93 (range = 2–7, SD = 1.10), and the average rating for 
participants in the control condition (N = 163) was 5.01 (range = 2–7, SD = 1.00). A one-
way ANOVA did not reveal any significant differences between the average mood 
ratings assigned by respondents in the self-concept threat, affirmation, or control 
conditions, F(2, 456) = 1.37, p = .25, !
2
 = .006. 
Participants in the self-concept threat condition assigned an average rating of 4.64 
(range = 1–7, SD = 1.11) to how they were feeling at the current moment. Those in the 
self-concept affirmation condition, on average, rated how they were currently feeling a 
4.72 (range 2–7, SD = 1.15), while those in the control condition had an average rating of 
4.78 (range = 1–7, SD = 1.19). A one-way ANOVA again did not reveal any significant 
differences in how respondents in the different experimental conditions rated they were 
currently feeling, F(2, 456) = .55, p = .58, !
2
 = .002. Based on analyses of the two items 
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in the mood questionnaire, one can infer that the experimental manipulation was a 
valid threat to the self-concept, instead of merely a manipulation of mood. 
The Name Letter Test 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete data on the 
Name Letter Test (NLT) were included in these first analyses (N = 396). The average 
initial-letter bias on the NLT for these participants was +1.34 (range = –3.43–5.64, SD = 
1.63).   
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 119) had an average NLT 
bias of +1.41 (range = –2.83–5.42, SD = 1.60). Those assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 132) demonstrated an average bias of  +1.29 (range = –2.79–
4.88, SD = 1.66), while respondents assigned to the control condition (N = 145) exhibited 
an average bias of  +1.34 (range = –3.43–5.64, SD = 1.64). A one-way ANOVA was used 
to test for differences in NLT initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and 
was nonsignificant, F(2, 393) = .16, p = .86, !
2
 = .0008.   
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem 
To examine whether the regression of NLT biases on threat condition varied as a 
function of participants’ explicit self-esteem scores, the researcher next used Aiken & 
West’s (1991) methods for testing for interactions. This analysis was based on data from 
respondents who completed the NLT, threat condition writing task, and those with 
complete data on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). The average initial-letter bias 
for this group of participants (N = 388) was +1.33 (range = –3.43–5.64, SD = 1.62).  
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First, each participant’s RSES score was centered by subtracting the sample 
mean from each score. The RSES sample mean was 20.74 (range 5–30, SD = 5.03) for 
this analysis. Next, threat condition was dummy-coded with the control group serving as 
the comparison group. A regression analysis was performed to test the b1 coefficient, 
which compared the means for the control and self-concept threat conditions, and the b2 
coefficient, which compared the means for the control and self-concept affirmation 
conditions. Results were similar in findings and logic to the one-way ANOVA reported 
above, i.e., threat condition did not predict NLT biases, R
2
 = .001, F(2, 385) = .11, p = 
.89.   
Next, the effect of explicit self-esteem as measured by centered RSES scores was 
added to the multiple regression equation. RSES scores did not help predict NLT initial-
letter biases when added to the model, R
2
change = .000, F(1, 384) = .01, p = .91. Finally, 
the interactions of RSES scores and the two threat condition comparisons were added to 
the model to determine whether NLT biases, when regressed on threat condition, varied 
as a function of explicit self-esteem. The overall model including the dummy variables 
(threat conditions), continuous variable (centered RSES scores), and their interactions 
was nonsignificant, R
2
 = .008, F(5, 382) = .60, p = .70. Joint tests of the b4 and b5 
coefficients (corresponding to the interaction of the self-concept threat vs. control 
condition ! RSES scores, and the interaction of the self-concept affirmation vs. control 
condition ! RSES scores, respectively), did not significantly improve the multiple 
regression model, R
2
change = .007, F(2, 382) = 1.39, p = .25.  
In sum, when initial-letter biases exhibited on the NLT were regressed on threat 
condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. Because 
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there was no presence of an interaction between threat conditions and RSES scores, a 
simple slopes test to examine the nature of an interaction was not warranted. Please refer 
to Table 6 for the progression of the multiple regression equations regressing NLT biases 






Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete ratings for the 
entire set of Cartoon 1 captions were included in these first analyses (N = 404). The 
average Cartoon 1 initial-letter bias for these participants was +.20 (range = –3.46–5.09, 
SD = 1.58).   
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 126) demonstrated an 
average bias of +.25 (range = –3.39–3.49, SD = 1.49). Those assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 133) exhibited an average bias of  +.13 (range = –3.46–4.44, 
SD = 1.62), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 145) had an average 
bias of  +.21 (range = –3.13–5.09, SD = 1.63). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for 
differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was 
nonsignificant, F(2, 401) = .21, p = .81, !
2
 = .001.   
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem 
This next analysis was based on data from respondents who completed one of the 
threat condition writing tasks, those with complete data on the RSES, and participants 
who had complete ratings for the entire set of twenty Cartoon 1 captions (N = 396). The 
average initial-letter bias for captions submitted by writers who shared participants’ first 
initial was +.22 for this analysis (range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.58) and the average RSES 
score was 20.71 (range = 5–30, SD = 4.97). 
To examine whether the regression of Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases on threat 
condition varied as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem scores, the researcher 
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again used Aiken & West’s (1991) multiple regression methods. First, each 
respondent’s RSES score was centered by subtracting the sample mean from each score, 
which was 20.71 (range = 5–30, SD = 4.97) for this sample. Next, threat condition was 
dummy-coded with the control group serving as the comparison group. A regression 
analysis was performed to test the b1 coefficient, which compared the mean initial-letter 
biases for the control and self-concept threat conditions, and the b2 coefficient, which 
compared the mean biases for the control and self-concept affirmation conditions. 
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT biases. In the current 
analysis, threat condition also did not predict biases toward captions submitted by writers 
who shared participants’ first initial, with results similar in findings and logic to the one-
way ANOVA reported above, i.e., threat condition did not predict Cartoon 1 initial-letter 
biases, R
2
 = .002, F(2, 393) = .41, p = .66.  
Next, the effect of explicit self-esteem as measured by centered RSES scores was 
added to the multiple regression equation. Again, RSES scores did not help predict 
initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 when this variable was added to the model, R
2
change = 
.007, F(1, 392) = 2.97, p = .09. Finally, the interactions of RSES scores and the two 
threat condition comparisons were added to the model to determine whether biases, when 
regressed on threat condition, varied as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. 
The overall model including the dummy variables (threat conditions), continuous variable 
(centered RSES scores), and their interactions was not significant, R
2
 = .010, F(5, 390) = 
.79, p = .56. Joint tests of the b4 and b5 coefficients (corresponding to the interaction of 
the self-concept threat vs. control condition ! RSES scores, and the interaction of the 
self-concept affirmation vs. control condition ! RSES scores, respectively), did not 
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significantly improve the multiple regression model, R
2
change = .000, F(2, 390) = .09,   
p = .92. Because there was no presence of interactions between threat conditions and 
RSES scores, a simple slopes test to examine the nature of an interaction was not 
performed. In sum, when initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 were regressed onto threat 
condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. Please 
refer to Table 7 for the progression of equations regressing initial-letter biases for 
Cartoon 1 on threat condition as a function of explicit self-esteem. 
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete ratings for the 
entire set of Cartoon 2 captions were included in these first analyses (N = 408). The 
average initial-letter bias for these participants was +.10 (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.47).   
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 126) demonstrated an 
average bias of +.11 (range = –3.68–3.48, SD = 1.41). Those assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 141) also had an average bias of  +.11 (range = –2.62–3.42, 
SD = 1.35), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 141) exhibited an 
average bias of  +.08 (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.65). A one-way ANOVA was used to 
test for differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was 
nonsignificant, F(2, 405) = .02, p = .98, !
2
 = .00009.   
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem 
This next analysis was based on data from respondents who completed a threat 
condition writing task, those who had complete ratings for the entire set of twenty 
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Cartoon 2 captions, and those with complete data on the RSES (N = 401). The average 
bias exhibited toward Cartoon 2 captions submitted by writers who shared participants’ 
first initial was +.11 for this sample (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.47). The average score 
on the RSES was 20.72 (range 5–30, SD = 5.03), which was used to center participants’ 





Aiken & West’s (1991) multiple regression methods were again used to 
examine whether the regression of Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases on threat condition 
varied as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. The same dummy codes for the 
three threat conditions in the prior two analyses were again used in this analysis. 
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initial-letter biases or 
differences in biases toward Cartoon 1 captions submitted by same-initial writers. In the 
current analysis, threat condition also did not predict biases toward Cartoon 2 captions 
submitted by writers with whom respondents shared a first initial, R
2
 = .000, F(2, 398) = 
.05, p = .95. This analysis was similar in logic and result to the ANOVA reported above.  
The effect of explicit self-esteem as measured by centered RSES scores was also 
nonsignificant when added to the regression model, R
2
change = .003, F(1, 397) = 1.08, p = 
.30. The overall model including the dummy variables (threat conditions), continuous 
variable (centered RSES scores), and their interactions was nonsignificant, R
2
 = .006, 
F(5, 395) = .48, p = .79. Adding the interaction terms did not significantly improve the 
model, R
2
change = .003, F(2, 395) = .61, p = .54. In sum, when Cartoon 2 biases were 
regressed on threat condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit 
self-esteem. For the progression of multiple regression equations, please refer to Table 8. 
Average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
 Participants who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete ratings for the 
entire set of Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 captions were included in these first analyses (N = 
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373). The average initial-letter bias for these participants was +.16 (range = –2.19–








Respondents in the self-concept threat condition (N = 117) demonstrated an 
average bias of +.18 (range = –2.12–2.39, SD = 1.02). Those assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 123) had an average bias of  +.16 (range = –2.19–3.02, SD = 
1.06), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 133) exhibited an average 
bias of  +.14 (range = –2.13–3.07, SD = 1.14). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for 
differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was 
nonsignificant, F(2, 370) = .05, p = .96, !
2
 = .0002.   
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem 
Next, initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 were averaged together and 
regressed onto threat condition to determine whether biases varied as a function of 
participants’ explicit self-esteem. Aiken & West’s (1991) multiple regression methods 
were again used and results are based on data from respondents who completed a threat 
condition writing task, those who had complete ratings for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 
captions, and those with complete data on the RSES (N = 367). The average bias 
exhibited toward Cartoon 1 and 2 captions submitted by writers who shared participants’ 
first initial was +.17 for this sample (range = –2.19–3.07, SD = 1.07). The average score 
on the RSES was 20.78 (range 5–30, SD = 5.00) and was used to center participants’ 
explicit self-esteem scores prior to multiple regression analyses.  
The same dummy codes from the prior multiple regression analyses were used in 
the current one. Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initial-
letter biases, or—individually—biases toward Cartoon 1 or 2 captions submitted by 
same-initial writers. In the current analysis, threat condition also failed to predict average 
 71 
 
biases demonstrated toward Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 captions submitted by writers 
with whom participants shared a first initial, R
2
 = .001, F(2, 364) = .12, p = .89.  
RSES scores also did not significantly predict average Cartoon 1 Cartoon 2 
initial-letter biases when this variable was added to the model, R
2
change = .008, F(1, 363) = 
2.97, p = .09. The overall model including the dummy variables (threat conditions), 
continuous variable (centered RSES scores), and their interactions was nonsignificant, R
2
 
= .012, F(5, 361) = .85, p = .52. Joint tests of the interaction terms were nonsignificant as 
well, R
2
change = .003, F(2, 361) = .52, p = .60, but the test of the b3 coefficient for the 
contribution of RSES scores to the final multiple regression model approached 
significance, t(361) = 1.84, p = .07. For the progression of multiple regression equations 
regressing initial-letter biases for both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 on threat condition as a 
function of participants’ explicit self-esteem, please refer to Table 9. 
The Name Letter Test (Nicknames) 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete ratings on the 
NLT, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name they “went by” that was 
different from that of their first given name were included in these first analyses (N = 53). 
The average nickname initial-letter bias demonstrated by these participants was +.28 
(range = –3.61–3.72, SD = 1.79).   
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 16) demonstrated an average 
bias of –.16 (range = –2.54–2.99, SD = 1.75). Those assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 20) had an average bias of  +.08 (range = –3.61–2.71, SD = 
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1.87), while respondents assigned to the control condition (N = 17) exhibited an 
average bias of  +.93 (range = –2.37–3.72, SD = 1.63). A one-way ANOVA was used to 
test for differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was 
nonsignificant, F(2, 50) = 1.79, p = .18, !
2






Interaction of Threat Condition ! Explicit Self-Esteem 
For this analysis, initial-letter biases were based on participants’ biases toward 
their nickname initial. Data were included from respondents who a) indicated they “went 
by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,” b) indicated their 
nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d) had complete data on the 
NLT, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 52). The average initial-letter bias for 
participants in this sample on the NLT was +.24 (range = –3.61–3.72, SD = 1.78). The 
sample mean for RSES scores was 20.15 (range 7–29, SD = 4.91) and was used to center 
participants’ RSES scores prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in initial-letter biases on 
the NLT or differences in biases toward same-initial writers’ captions for Cartoon 1 or 
Cartoon 2 (individually or when averaged together). In the current analysis, threat 
condition also did not predict nickname initial biases on the NLT, R
2
 = .054, F(2, 49) = 
1.40, p = .26. Centered RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases toward 
nickname initials when this variable was added to the model, R
2
change = .000, F(1, 48) = 
.01, p = .94. The overall model including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and 
their interactions was nonsignificant, R
2
 = .148, F(5, 46) = 1.60, p = .18. The interaction 
terms did not together significantly improve the multiple regression model, although they 
approached significance, R
2
change = .094, F(2, 46) = 2.53, p = .09. In sum, when biases 
demonstrated toward nickname initial letters on the NLT were regressed on threat 
condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. For the 




      
 
Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases (Nicknames) 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete caption ratings on 
Cartoon 1, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name they “went by” that 
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was different from that of their first given name were included in these first analyses 
(N = 45). The average nickname initial-letter bias demonstrated by these participants was 
–.28 (range = –3.78–3.80, SD = 1.88).  
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 15) demonstrated an average 
bias of +.19 (range = –3.13–3.80, SD = 1.94). Those assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 16) had an average bias of  –.52 (range = –3.28–3.21, SD = 
1.87), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 14) exhibited an average 
bias of –.50 (range = –3.78–3.79, SD = 1.86). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for 
differences in biases between the three threat conditions and was nonsignificant, F(2, 42) 
= .69, p = .51, !
2
 = .03160779.   
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem 
This analysis was based on data from respondents who: a) indicated they “went 
by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,” b) indicated their 
nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d) completed all ratings for 
Cartoon 1, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 44). The average nickname initial 
bias for participants in this sample was –.37 (range = –3.78–3.80, SD = 1.79). The 
average score on the RSES was 20.45 (range 8–30, SD = 4.60) for this sample and was 
used to center explicit self-esteem scores prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken & 
West, 1991). 
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initial-letter biases 





Cartoon 1 or Cartoon 2 (individually or when averaged together). In the current 
analysis, threat condition also did not predict Cartoon 1 biases toward nickname initials, 
R
2
 = .057, F(2, 41) = 1.23, p = .30. RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases 
toward nickname initials when this variable was added to the model, R
2
change = .001, F(1, 
40) = .03, p = .86. The addition of the interaction terms also failed to improve the 
multiple regression model, R
2
change = .035, F(2, 38) = .73, p = .49, and the overall model 
including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and their interactions was 
nonsignificant, R
2
 = .092, F(5, 38) = .77, p = .58. For the progression of equations 
regressing Cartoon 1 nickname initial biases on threat condition as a function of explicit 
self-esteem, please refer to Table 11.  
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases (Nicknames) 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete caption ratings on 
Cartoon 2, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name they “went by” that 
was different from that of their first given name were included in these first analyses (N = 
43). The average nickname initial-letter bias demonstrated by these participants was –.19 
(range = –3.58–3.02, SD = 1.24).   
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 13) demonstrated an average 
bias of +.03 (range = –2.06–1.93, SD = 1.10). Those assigned to the self-concept 
affirmation condition (N = 18) had an average bias of  –.29 (range = –3.58–2.01, SD = 
1.35), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 12) also exhibited an 
average bias of –.29 (range = –1.98–3.02, SD = 1.30). A one-way ANOVA was used to 
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test for differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was 
nonsignificant, F(2, 40) = .28, p = .76, !
2









Interaction of Threat Condition ! Explicit Self-Esteem 
For this set of analyses, initial-letter biases were based on respondents’ 
preferences for their nickname initial. Participants were included in the analyses if a) they 
indicated they “went by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,” 
b) they reported their nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d) 
rated all twenty captions for Cartoon 2, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 43). 
The mean nickname initial bias was the same average reported for the above sample: –.19 
(range = –3.58–3.02, SD = 1.24). The average score on the RSES was 20.84 for the 
present sample (range 8–30, SD = 4.43), which was used to center participants’ explicit 
self-esteem scores prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Biases toward captions submitted by writers who shared participants’ first 
nickname initial were regressed on threat condition as a function of explicit self-esteem. 
Thus far, threat condition failed to predict initial-letter biases in all analyses, and in the 
current analysis, threat condition also did not predict Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases, 
R
2
 = .014, F(2, 40) = .28, p = .76. RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases 
when this variable was added to the model, R
2
change = .015, F(1, 39) = .62, p = .44. 
Addition of the interactions between threat conditions and RSES scores did not 
significantly improve the multiple regression model, R
2
change = .068, F(2, 37) = 1.38, p = 
.26, and the overall model including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and their 
interactions was nonsignificant, R
2
 = .097, F(5, 37) = .79, p = .56. For the progression of 
multiple regression equations regressing Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases on threat 







Average Cartoon 1 and 2 Initial-Letter Biases 
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions 
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat 
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete caption ratings on 
both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name 
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they “went by” that was different from that of their first given name were included in 
these first analyses (N = 39). The average nickname initial bias demonstrated by these 
participants was –.32 (range = –3.30–1.98, SD = 1.08).   
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 13) exhibited an average bias 
of –.05 (range = –1.28–1.68, SD = 1.06). Those assigned to the self-concept affirmation 
condition (N = 15) had an average bias of  –.52 (range = –3.30–1.98, SD = 1.31), while 
respondents assigned to the control condition (N = 11) demonstrated an average bias of    
–.37 (range = –1.39–1.20, SD = .73). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences 
in biases between the three threat conditions and was nonsignificant, F(2, 36) = .67, p = 
.52, !
2
 = .03572313.   
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem 
This analysis was based on average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 biases exhibited 
toward nickname initials. Data were included from respondents who a) indicated they 
“went by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,” b) reported 
their nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d) rated all captions 
for both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 39). The 
mean nickname initial bias demonstrated by participants in this sample was the same 
average reported above: –.32 (range = –3.30–1.98, SD = 1.08). The average score on the 
RSES was 20.87 (range 8–30, SD = 4.43) and was used to center participants’ scores 
prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Biases toward captions submitted by writers who shared respondents’ nickname 
initial were regressed on threat condition as a function of explicit self-esteem. Previously, 
threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initial-letter biases (based on 
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participants’ initial for their first given name or their nickname initial) or differences in 
biases on Cartoon 1 or Cartoon 2 individually (for initials of first given names or 
nicknames). In the current analysis, threat condition also did not predict average Cartoon 
1 and Cartoon 2 biases toward captions written by same nickname initial writers, R
2
 = 
.036, F(2, 36) = .67, p = .52. RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases when 
this variable was added to the model, R
2
change = .008, F(1, 35) = .30, p = .59. The 
interactions of threat condition and RSES scores also failed to significantly improve the 
multiple regression model, R
2
change = .095, F(2, 33) = 1.82, p = .18. The overall model 
including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and their interactions was 
nonsignificant, R
2
 = .139, F(5, 33) = 1.06, p = .40. For the progression of equations 
regressing average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases on threat condition as 
a function of explicit self-esteem, please refer to Table 13.  
In sum, despite previous studies which have found initial-letter biases to diverge 
among those with low and high explicit self-esteem after experiencing a self-concept 
threat (Jones et al., 2002), the current investigation did not find evidence of such an 
interaction on any of the initial-letter preference tasks. Name-letter preferences’ function 
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CHAPTER 7 
SELF-ATTITUDE ACCESSIBILITY AND INITIAL-LETTER BIASES 
 Participants were randomly assigned to surveys containing one of two 
administration orders of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1989): 
before vs. after the initial-letter preference tasks. The purpose of this scale was to 
examine respondents’ conscious self-worth (“explicit self-esteem”) and its relation to 
initial-letter biases, as discussed in the previous chapter. Administration order of this 
explicit measure was manipulated to compare differences in biases between participants 
whose self-attitudes were accessible with biases of those who completed the RSES after 
the implicit tasks, corresponding to the “high” and “low” self-attitude accessibility 
conditions, respectively. Based on previous research, respondents whose self-attitudes 
had been primed prior to the Name Letter Test (NLT) and cartoon caption rating task 
were expected to exhibit stronger initial-letter biases than their low self-attitude 
accessibility counterparts (Krizan & Suls, 2008). 
The Name Letter Test 
Of the 420 participants with complete and non-redundant data on the NLT, 410 of 
these respondents also had complete data on the RSES. The average NLT initial-letter 
bias demonstrated by this group of participants was +1.36 (range = –3.43–6.05, SD = 
1.62). Participants assigned to the “high self-attitude accessibility” condition (N = 214) 
on average exhibited a +1.43 initial-letter bias (range = –2.83–5.64, SD = 1.62), while 
those assigned to the “low self-attitude accessibility” condition (N = 196) on average
 84 
 
demonstrated a +1.29 bias toward their first given name initial (range = –3.43–6.05, 
SD = 1.63). While in the predicted direction, high self-attitude accessibility participants 
did not exhibit significantly stronger initial-letter biases on the NLT than their low self-
attitude accessibility counterparts, t(408) = .89, p = .38 (two-tailed), d = .09.  
Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases 
Of the 428 respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for Cartoon 1 
captions, 419 of these participants also had complete data on the RSES. The average 
initial-letter bias exhibited by this group of participants was +.20 (range = –3.46–5.09, 
SD = 1.58). High self-attitude accessibility respondents (N = 220) on average 
demonstrated a +.17 bias on Cartoon 1 (range = –3.46–4.30, SD = 1.61), while low self-
attitude accessibility participants (N = 199) on average exhibited a +.24 bias toward the 
caption written by the writer who shared their first given name initial (range = –3.45–
5.09, SD = 1.56). Differences in initial-letter biases between participants with high and 
low self-attitude accessibility were not in the predicted direction and were not statistically 
significant, t(417) = –.47, p = .64 (two-tailed), d = –.04. 
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases 
Of the 429 respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for Cartoon 2 
captions, 421 of these participants also had complete data on the RSES. The average 
initial-letter bias demonstrated by this group of participants was +.10 (range = –3.81–
4.47, SD = 1.47). High self-attitude accessibility participants (N = 213) on average 
exhibited a +.26 initial-letter bias (range = –3.14–4.47, SD = 1.47), while low self-
attitude accessibility respondents (N = 208) demonstrated an average negative bias of      
–.05 toward the caption written by the writer who shared their first given name initial 
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(range = –3.81–3.48, SD = 1.46). Differences in biases between participants with high 
and low self-attitude accessibility were in the predicted direction and were statistically 
significant, t(419) = 2.16, p = .03 (two-tailed), d = .21. 
Average Cartoon 1 and 2 Initial-Letter Biases 
Of the 394 respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for both Cartoon 
1 and Cartoon 2 captions, 387 of these participants also had complete data on the RSES. 
The average bias exhibited by this group of participants was +.16 (range = –2.46–3.12, 
SD = 1.08). High self-attitude accessibility participants (N = 200) on average 
demonstrated a +.23 initial-letter bias across both sets of cartoon captions (range = –
2.46–3.07, SD = 1.12), while low self-attitude accessibility respondents (N = 187) 
exhibited an average bias of +.08 toward captions written by writers who shared their 
first given name initial (range = –2.19–3.12, SD = 1.03). Differences in biases between 
participants with high and low self-attitude accessibility were in the direction predicted, 
but were not statistically significant, t(385) = 1.33, p = .19 (two-tailed), d = .14. 
Overall, biases demonstrated on the initial-letter preference tasks did not 
significantly differ between respondents who completed the explicit measure prior to vs. 
after the implicit tasks, except on Cartoon 2. For average initial-letter biases exhibited by 
low and high self-attitude accessibility participants on all initial-letter preference tasks 
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CHAPTER 8 
GENDER DIFFERENCES AND GENDER BIASES 
 Based on previous research investigating gender differences in name-letter 
preferences (Kityama & Karasawa, 1997; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002), women 
were expected to demonstrate stronger initial-letter biases than men. Ostensibly, women 
have a stronger affinity toward their first names because these names will remain with 
them throughout their lifetime. This study was also the first to examine whether gender 
biases serve to strengthen the name letter effect. First, differences in initial-letter biases 
between men and women were examined. 
Gender Differences 
The Name Letter Test 
As predicted, initial-letter biases on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were 
significantly stronger for women than for men, t(418) = 2.51, p = .01 (two-tailed), d = 
.25. On average, women exhibited a +1.52 bias toward their initial letter (range = –2.83–
6.05, SD = 1.63; N = 270), while men demonstrated a +1.11 bias toward their initial 
(range = –3.43–4.97, SD = 1.61; N = 150). Individually, women’s and men’s initial-letter 
biases on the NLT were both significantly different from zero, t(269) = 15.38, p < .001, d 
= 1.14 (women), and t(149) = 8.44, p < .001, d = .69 (men). 
When biases toward nickname initials were examined, men unexpectedly 
demonstrated stronger biases than did women. Men’s average biases (M = +.64, 
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range = –3.61–4.97, SD = 1.61; N = 25) and women’s average biases (M = +.14, range 
= –2.70–3.72, SD = 1.86; N = 33) differed by half of a scale point, however, this 
difference was not statistically significant, t(56) = –1.08, p = .29 (two-tailed), d = .29. 
Individually, men’s nickname initial biases were marginally significantly different from 
zero (with 0 = no bias), t(24) = 2.00, p < .06 (two-tailed), d = .40; but women’s nickname 
initial biases were not, t(32) = .43, p = .67, (two-tailed) d = .08. This finding is interesting 
because women, as expected, demonstrated stronger initial-letter biases on the NLT than 
men when the initial for their first given name was used in analyses, but men exhibited 
stronger biases than women when it came to evaluations of their nickname initial. 
Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases 
Average biases exhibited toward captions written by same-initial writers were 
identical between women (M = +.18, range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.64; N = 282) and men 
(M = +.18, range = –.75–3.94, SD = 1.48; N = 146). Individually, women’s initial-letter 
biases were marginally significant, t(281) = 1.86, p = .06 (two-tailed), d = .11, but men’s 
biases were not, t(145) = 1.44, p = .15 (two-tailed), d = .12.  
Men did not demonstrate a significant bias toward captions submitted by same-
nickname initial writers for Cartoon 1 (M = +.002, range = –3.02–3.80, SD = 1.95; N = 
20), t(19) = .01, p = .996 (two-tailed), d = .001. An unexpected finding, however, 
emerged for women. Not only did they not prefer captions written by writers who shared 
their nickname initial, they rated them as significantly less humorous than captions 
submitted by writers who did not share their nickname initial (M = –.63, range = –3.78–
3.21, SD = 1.69; N = 31), t(30) = –2.09, p < .05 (two-tailed), d = –.37. Whereas men were 
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essentially unbiased toward captions written by same-nickname initial writers, women 
were unexpectedly biased against these writers’ captions, and significantly so.  
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases 
This time, men demonstrated stronger biases (M = +.14, range = –3.81–3.44, SD = 
1.47; N = 143) than did women (M = +.07, range = –3.25– 4.47, SD = 1.49; N = 286) 
toward captions submitted by same-initial writers, however this gender difference was 
not statistically significant, t(427) = –.428, p = .67 (two-tailed), d = .05. Neither men’s 
nor women’s individual biases were significantly different from zero, t(142) = 1.14, p = 
.26, two-tailed (men), d = .10, and t(285) = .85, p = .40, two-tailed (women), d = .05.  
In nickname initial analyses, neither women nor men demonstrated biases toward 
captions submitted by writers who shared their nickname initial. Women, on average, 
exhibited a –.10 bias (range = –2.06–3.02, SD = 1.33; N = 32), rating captions by same-
initial writers slightly lower than captions written by different-initial writers. Men, on 
average, demonstrated a slightly less negative bias of –.04 (range = –3.58–2.01, SD = 
1.26; N = 17). Women’s and men’s difference in biases was not significant, t(47) = –.16, 
p = .88 (two-tailed), d = .05.  
Average Cartoon 1 and 2 Initial-Letter Biases 
 When initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 were averaged together, 
women and men both exhibited a slight bias toward captions submitted by same-initial 
writers. On average, women rated both captions written by same-initial writers +.14 
points higher (range = –2.46–3.07, SD = 1.08; N = 263) relative to their ratings of non-
initial writers’ captions and as compared to normative ipsatized baseline ratings. This 
bias toward initial-letter writers’ captions was significantly different from zero, t(262) = 
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2.05, p = .04, d = .13. Men rated captions written by same-initial writers on average 
+.16 points higher (range = –2.01–3.12, SD = 1.09; N = 131) than non-initial writers’ 
captions and as compared to normative baselines. Men’s average initial-letter biases, 
however, only approached significance, t(130) = 1.72, p = .09, d = .15. Taken together, 
both women and men demonstrated small biases toward both captions written by same-
initial writers, and women’s and men’s biases did not significantly differ from each other, 
t(392) = –.23, p = .82 (two-tailed), d = .02. 
Finally, in nickname analyses, neither women nor men exhibited biases toward 
their nickname initial letter. On the contrary, women on average exhibited a –.29 negative 
bias toward captions written by writers who shared their nickname initial (range = –2.52–
1.98, SD = .98; N = 29), while men exhibited a slightly stronger negative bias of –.34 
toward nickname-initial writers’ captions (range = –3.30–1.68, SD = 1.16; N = 16). While 
both women and men unexpectedly exhibited negative nickname initial biases, neither of 
these biases were individually significantly different from zero, t(28) = –1.57, p = .13 
(two-tailed), d = –.30 (women), and t(15) = –1.17, p = .26, (two-tailed), d = –.29 (men). 
Gender differences in biases were also not statistically significant, t(43) = .27, p = .87 
(two-tailed), d = .05.  
Same-Gender Biases 
Next, biases toward captions submitted by writers who were the same gender as 
participants were measured by computing a “same-gender preference score,” or “same-
gender bias.” The self-corrected algorithm (S-algorithm; LeBel & Gawronski, 2009) was 
used instead of the ipsatized algorithm because computation of normative baseline ratings 
for captions would not be a neutral comparison metric because these baselines would be 
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comprised of caption ratings made by participants of the opposite gender. Instead, the 
average rating men assigned to captions submitted by women writers (“opposite gender”) 
was subtracted from the average rating men assigned to captions submitted by men 
writers (“same gender”) to obtain their “same-gender bias” at the individual level. This 
procedure was repeated for women writers, with the average rating assigned to captions 
written by men subtracted from the average rating women assigned to captions written by 
other women. 
Cartoon 1 
 The average same-gender bias for men respondents with complete caption ratings 
on Cartoon 1 was +.22 (range = –1.20–2.20, SD = .65; N = 146). Men’s self-corrected 
increases in liking for captions written by men relative to ratings of captions written by 
women were significantly different from zero, t(145) = 4.14, p < .001, d = .34. 
Examination of women participants’ same-gender biases presented a different, opposite 
picture. Average biases ranged between –2.40 and 1.80, with a Mean of –.28 (SD = .66; N 
= 282), indicating a bias toward captions submitted by men writers. While unexpected 
and not in the predicted direction, women respondents’ bias toward captions submitted by 
men was highly significant, t(281) = –7.106, p < .001, d = –.42. The difference in same-
gender biases exhibited between men and women participants (N = 428) was also highly 
significant, t(426) = 7.50, p < .001, d = .76.  
Cartoon 2 
 These analyses were repeated for Cartoon 2 caption ratings and the opposite 
pattern of results emerged. This time, men respondents who rated all captions for Cartoon 
2 demonstrated a bias toward captions written by women (M = –.18, range = –2.20-1.00, 
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SD = .53; N = 143). Although not in the predicted direction, this bias was significant, 
t(142) = –4.07, p < .001, d = –.34. Women participants were biased toward captions 
written by other women for Cartoon 2 (M = +.27, range = –1.70–2.60, SD = .63; N = 286) 
and this same-gender bias was significant, t(285) = 7.33, p < .001, d = .43. The difference 
in same-gender biases exhibited between men and women participants on Cartoon 2 was 
significant, t(427) = –7.41, p < .001, d = .77.  
Average of Cartoon 1 and 2 
 When same-gender biases for Cartoon 1 and 2 were averaged together, men were 
unbiased toward captions submitted by men (M = +.02, range = –1.15–1.35, SD = .41; N 
= 131), which was nonsignificant, t(130) = .50, p = .62, d = .05. Women were similarly 
unbiased toward women-written captions for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 when biases were 
averaged together (M = +.004, range = –1.60–1.80, SD = .46; N = 263), t(262) = .15, p = 
.88, d = .01. The difference in same-gender biases exhibited between men and women 
participants (N = 394) was also nonsignificant, t(392) = .29, p = .77, d = .04. 
Shared Gender and Initial-Letter Biases 
To determine whether initial-letter biases were even stronger when participants 
shared both the same first initial and the same gender as a caption writer, same-initial 
caption writer ratings were next coded as “same gender” vs. “different gender” for each 
respondent. For example, for a male participant with the initial letter “A,” his ipsatized 
and baseline-corrected humor rating assigned to the caption written by “Andrew” would 
be coded as “same gender” for Cartoon 1. His humor rating for the caption writer 
“Amanda” on Cartoon 2 would be coded as “different gender.” Equal numbers of each 
gender of caption writers (10 women’s names and 10 men’s names) for each of the 20 
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included letters of the alphabet were assigned to captions in random order for Caption 
1. The opposite caption writer gender was assigned to that initial letter for Cartoon 2, 
thus, participants’ gender matched that of their same-initial writer for either Cartoon 1 or 
Cartoon 2, but never both. 
Cartoon 1 
Using the above coding scheme for the 428 respondents with complete Cartoon 1 
humor ratings, 205 participants' gender matched that of their same-initial caption writer 
and 223 participants’ gender did not match that of their same-initial caption writer. On 
average, respondents’ initial-letter biases were + .20 points higher when their initial-
matching caption writer was also the same gender (M = +.29, SD = 1.61), compared to 
initial-letter biases exhibited by their initial-matching only counterparts (M = +.09, SD = 
1.56). This difference in biases was in the direction predicted, however, it was not 
statistically significant, t(426) = 1.31, p = .19 (two-tailed), d = .13.   
Cartoon 2 
 Out of 429 respondents with complete Cartoon 2 caption ratings, 217 participants’ 
gender also matched that of their initial-matching caption writer’s, while 212 
participants’ gender did not match that of their initial-matching caption writer. Mean 
initial-letter biases for initial- and gender-matching participants was +.13 (SD =1.52), 
while mean name-letter preferences for initial-only matching respondents was +.06 (SD = 
1.45). This difference, while again in the predicted direction, was not significant, t(427) = 





Cartoon 1 Nicknames 
 This analysis was based on 51 respondents who reported a nickname initial and 
had complete ratings for Cartoon 1. Participants whose gender also matched that of a 
nickname initial-matching caption writer (N = 31) exhibited an average bias of –.27 (SD 
= 1.74), while those who only shared a nickname initial with a caption writer (N = 20), 
demonstrated an average bias of –.56 (SD = 1.94). Both biases were unexpectedly 
negative, but gender-matching participants’ nickname-initial biases were less negative 
than those for gender-mismatching participants. This difference, however, was not 
statistically significant, t(49) = .57, p = .58, d = .16.  
Cartoon 2 Nicknames 
 Of the 49 respondents who provided their nickname initial, 21 shared the same 
gender as their nickname initial-matching caption writer. Their average initial-letter bias 
was –.17 (SD = 1.48), compared to the average bias of  –.01 (SD = 1.16) demonstrated by 
the 28 participants who only shared a nickname initial with a caption writer. This 
difference was not in the direction predicted and was also not statistically significant, 
t(47) = .437, p = .66, d =  –.12.   
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CHAPTER 9 
IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM AND INITIAL-LETTER BIASES 
Implicit self-esteem was assessed using Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, and Maio’s 
(2008) single-item measure of name-liking to examine its association with initial-letter 
biases. Respondents rated how much they liked their full name from 1) not at all to 7) 
very much as an implicit measure of their unconscious global self-value and self-worth. 
The average name-liking rating was 5.59 (range = 1–7, SD = 1.30; N = 479). Men 
demonstrated slightly higher implicit self-esteem than did women, rating their name on 
average .13 points higher (M = 5.68, range = 2–7, SD = 1.25; N = 166) than women 
participants (M = 5.55, SD = 1.33; N = 313). Men’s and women’s difference in implicit 
self-esteem scores, however, was not statistically significant, t(477) = 1.07, p = .28 (two-
tailed), d = .10.  
To examine the effect of implicit self-esteem on initial-letter biases, respondents’ 
name-liking scores were first standardized. Cut-off values for “low implicit self-esteem” 
were equivalent to 1.00 or more standard deviations below the mean (set at zero), values 
greater than –1.00 standard deviation, but less than +1.00 standard deviation were 
categorized as “average implicit self-esteem,” and values 1.00 standard deviation or more 
above the mean were considered to be suggestive of “high implicit self-esteem.” Of the 
479 participants who completed the single-item measure, 89 (18.6%) had
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standardized scores indicative of “low implicit self-esteem,” 247 participants (51.6%) 
had “average implicit self-esteem,” and 143 had “high implicit self-esteem” (29.9%).  
The Name Letter Test 
Scores on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were regressed on participants’ level of 
implicit self-esteem. Level of implicit self-esteem (“low,” “average,” and “high”) was 
dummy coded, with the “average implicit self-esteem” group serving as the comparison 
group. As predicted, level of implicit self-esteem predicted initial-letter biases on the 
NLT, but only accounted for 2% of the variance in biases, R
2
 = .02, F(2, 417) = 3.58, p = 
.03. Also as predicted, the dummy-coded variable comparing the low implicit self-esteem 
group to the average implicit self-esteem group was negatively associated with initial-
letter biases, however, it was not a significant predictor, t(417) = –.62, p = .54. The 
dummy-coded variable comparing the high and average implicit self-esteem groups, 
however, was a significant and positive predictor of initial-letter biases, t(417) = 2.28, p = 
.02. A follow-up regression analysis comparing only the low implicit self-esteem group 
to the high implicit self-esteem group was also significant, R
2
 = .03, F(1, 202) = 5.17, p = 
.02. 
When initial-letter biases exhibited on the NLT were regressed on level of 
implicit self-esteem (“low,” “average,” and “high”) for participants with nicknames (N = 
58), implicit self-esteem did not significantly predict biases, R
2
 = .04, F(2, 55) = 1.05, p 
= .36. 
Cartoon 1 
Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases were also regressed on participants’ level of implicit 
self-esteem (“low, “average,” and “high”). The same dummy codes were used from the 
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above analysis, with the “average implicit self-esteem” group serving as the 
comparison group. Level of implicit self-esteem did not predict biases toward captions 
written by same-initial writers, R
2
 = .002, F(2, 425) = .46, p = .63. The dummy-coded 
variable comparing the low implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem 
group was again negatively associated with initial-letter biases, however, it was not a 
statistically significant predictor, t(425) = –.45, p = .66. The dummy-coded variable 
comparing the high implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group 
was positively associated with initial-letter biases, but this predictor also was not 
statistically significant, t(425) = .67, p = .51. A follow-up regression analysis comparing 
only the low implicit self-esteem group to the high implicit self-esteem group was non-
significant as well, R
2
 = .004, F(1, 208) = .88, p = .35.  
When Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases were regressed on level of implicit self-
esteem for respondents with nicknames (N = 51), implicit self-esteem also did not 
significantly predict biases, R
2
 = .01, F(2, 48) = .18, p = .83. 
Cartoon 2 
Level of implicit self-esteem did not predict biases toward Cartoon 2 captions 
written by same-initial writers, R
2
 = .01, F(2, 426) = 1.16, p = .31. The dummy-coded 
variable comparing the low implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem 
group was again negatively associated with biases, however, it was not a significant 
individual predictor, t(426) = –1.42, p = .16. The dummy-coded variable comparing the 
high implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group also was not 
statistically significant, t(426) = .08, p = .93. A follow-up regression analysis comparing 
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only the low implicit self-esteem group to the high implicit self-esteem group did not 
reach statistical significance, R
2
 = .01, F(1, 204) = 1.96, p = .16.  
When Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases were regressed on level of implicit self-
esteem (“low,” “average,” and “high”) for respondents with nicknames (N = 49), implicit 
self-esteem did not significantly predict biases, R
2
 = .04, F(2, 46) = .96, p = .39. 
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2  
Level of implicit self-esteem did not predict biases toward captions written by 
same-initial writers when initial-letter biases were averaged together for both cartoons,  
R
2
 = .01, F(2, 391) = 1.45, p = .24. The dummy-coded variable comparing the low 
implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group was again negatively 
associated with biases, however, it did not reach statistical significance as an individual 
predictor, t(391) = –1.43, p = .16. The dummy-coded variable comparing the high 
implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group was positively 
associated with biases, but this predictor was again nonsignificant, t(391) = .45, p = .66. 
A follow-up regression analysis comparing only the low implicit self-esteem group to the 
high implicit self-esteem group did not reach statistical significance, R
2
 = .01, F(1, 188) 
= 2.73, p = .10.  
When average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases were regressed on 
level of implicit self-esteem for participants with nicknames (N = 45), implicit self-
esteem was a marginally significant predictor of nickname-initial biases, R
2
 = .13, F(2, 
42) = 3.01, p = .06. This time, the dummy-coded variable comparing the low implicit 
self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group was positive and significant, 
t(42) = 2.41, p = .02. The variable comparing the high implicit self-esteem group to the 
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average implicit self-esteem group was also positive, but it was not significant, t(42) = 
.41, p = .69. Differences in initial-letter biases among participants with low, average, and 
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CHAPTER 10 
DISCUSSION 
 The aims of the present investigation were to provide a novel test of the name 
letter effect and to introduce two new variables that might influence initial-letter biases. 
The current study opened “the black box” of the subjective experience of humor and 
found preliminary empirical evidence that judgments of humor can fall prey to an 
automatic, unconscious and objective bias in predictable ways: via implicit egotism. 
Instead of being just another demonstration of the name letter effect, the relationship 
between implicit self-esteem and name-letter preferences was also examined in order to 
shed light on the current debate as to whether the Name Letter Test (NLT) measures 
one’s underlying implicit global sense of self-worth or is best understood as a measure of 
implicit egotism: the tendency to gravitate toward objects that share our self-attributes 
such as our name letters.  
Past theory on implicit egotism and research on the name letter effect suggests 
that these biases are based on people’s implicit self-attitudes, which are overwhelmingly 
positive in content. However, recent researchers have suggested that perhaps there is 
another, overlooked side to the implicit egotism coin: name-letter biases might very well 
be reversed for those who possess truly negative unconscious self-attitudes, i.e., “low 
implicit self-esteem” (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005). These authors recently raised 
important questions for future research on the name-letter effect: are name-letter 
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preferences due to participants’ good fortune of possessing favorable implicit self-
attitudes, or would biases be smaller or even reversed for those with low levels of implicit 
self-esteem? Pelham et al. (2005) emphasized that answers to these questions would be 
important to both social as well as clinical psychology. Thus, measurement of 
participants’ level of implicit self-esteem and its influence on initial-letter biases was a 
critical aim of the current study. If name-letter preferences are indeed representative of 
one’s underlying self-attitudes, then participants with low implicit self-esteem should not 
exhibit biases toward their name letters—perhaps even demonstrating a “reverse” name 
letter effect. However, if name letter effects occurred regardless of respondents’ level of 
implicit self-worth, then name-letter preferences as a measure of implicit egotism—as it 
was originally designed—would be supported.  
Biases toward persons of the same gender have been demonstrated in supervisor-
supervisee relationships (Worthington & Stern, 1985) and therapist-patient treatment 
outcomes (Zlotnick, Elkin, & Shea, 1998; Sterling, Gottheil, Weinstein, & Serota, 1998), 
but had never before been examined within the field of implicit egotism. The current 
investigation aimed to determine whether shared gender with fictitious caption writers 
would further increase initial-letter biases, becoming the first implicit egotism experiment 
to examine both types of biases in tandem.  
By examining these two potential new influences on initial-letter biases, as well 
as providing additional tests of previously identified variables’ impact on these biases, 
the present study sought to increase the extant implicit egotism knowledge base by taking 
another look at name-letter preferences. Biases toward nickname initials were also 
measured, with results challenging the notion that virtually any self-related attribute can 
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ignite implicit egotism. Finally, while many researchers have and continue to 
administer the Name Letter Test (NLT) as a measure of implicit self-esteem, the current 
study sought to examine the overlap between it and a newer measure of implicit self-
esteem: Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, & Maio’s (2008) single-item measure of name-
liking. 
General Initial-Letter Biases 
 As predicted, name letter effects were found on both the NLT and in judgments of 
humor. Participants demonstrated a significant bias toward their first given name initial 
on the Name Letter Test (NLT), increasing their ratings by +1.38 points relative to non-
initials and group-averaged normative baselines on the 1) not at all beautiful to 7) 
extremely beautiful scale. Also as predicted, respondents exhibited initial-letter biases in 
their humor ratings for cartoon captions submitted by same-initial writers. The average 
bias demonstrated across both sets of captions was +.15 points on the 1) not at all 
humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale. While only a small initial letter effect was 
found among ratings for captions submitted by same-initial writers, this finding suggests 
that the otherwise subjective experience of humor operates at least partially outside of our 
conscious awareness via one of our unconscious self-related biases—our implicit 
preference for our name letters. 
 The present study offered a rare opportunity to examine biases toward initials of 
names that participants indicated they “went by” and were different from the initial 
indicated for their first given name, i.e., “nicknames.” The purpose of this distinction in 
name-letter bias targets was two-fold. First, it allowed the researcher to confirm that 
respondents indeed “went by” the initial they indicated for their first given name in order 
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to establish the correct target name letter for analyses. Secondly, if they did not “go 
by” their first given name, participants were asked to indicate the first letter for another 
name such as a “nickname” if this was the name they routinely went by. In this way, the 
current investigation became the first implicit egotism experiment to examine nickname 
initial biases as distinct from first given name initial-letter biases. 
 As compared to nickname initials, the present study found that name-letter 
preferences are relevant to first given name initials only—regardless of whether one goes 
by their first given name or not. Nickname-initial biases on the NLT did not reach 
statistical significance and an unexpected pattern of results emerged when it came to 
biases demonstrated toward captions submitted by same-nickname initial writers. 
Participants actually preferred captions submitted by writers with whom they did not 
share a nickname initial, rating same-initial writers’ captions on average .30 points lower 
across both cartoons. Curiously, this “reverse nickname-letter effect” was significant. 
This is intriguing, especially when researchers such as Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones 
(2002) have argued virtually “anything that people associate with the self” can prompt 
implicit egotism (p. 470). Moreover, authors such as Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, and 
Carvallo (2005) later eliminated participants from their name-letter analyses if they went 
by another name such as a nickname, because “the NL (name-letter) brand should have 
been constructed from the nickname” (p. 409). Why biases against nickname initials 
were found on the caption-rating tasks is counterintuitive and raises several empirical 
questions. As the first implicit egotism study to examine nickname initial biases 
specifically—and as distinct from first given name initial biases—a few possible 
explanations are offered. 
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First, perhaps name letter effects were too small to translate to nickname-
initial biases. Only a small initial letter effect was found in the humor judgments exercise, 
thus it is possible that biases exhibited toward captions submitted by writers who shared 
participants’ first given name initials were too small to translate to nickname initials. 
However, biases observed on the NLT for first given name initials were very large, yet 
they still did not translate into significant biases toward nickname initials on the NLT. 
Nickname initial biases were decreased and sometimes even reversed. This begs 
the question as to whether name-letter and nickname-letter preferences assess general 
name-esteem, implicit egotism, or are a measure of implicit self-esteem. Perhaps 
participants held negative attitudes toward their nicknames and/or nickname initials and 
thus when confronted with nickname letter stimuli, their ratings reflected this negative 
attitude toward this particular self-attribute. However, it seems odd for a person to “go 
by” a name they do not particularly like. Implicit self-esteem for respondents who 
indicated they went by their first given name and for those who went by a nickname was 
nearly identical. However, this measure is based on participants’ liking for their entire 
name (including their first and last name together) and it is unclear on which name 
respondents based their ratings, i.e., their first given name and last name or their 
nickname and last name. A name-liking measure which taps liking for participants’ 
nicknames specifically might or might not provide a window into these respondents’ 
implicit sense of self-worth, depending on how much of their identity is derived from 
their unofficial name. But in the end, implicit self-esteem—as measured by full name 
liking—only explained 1–2% of the variance in name-letter preferences anyway. 
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Another potential explanation for decreased nickname initial letter biases is 
that nicknames and nickname initials might not be as closely linked to one’s identity as 
are first given names and their corresponding initials. Perhaps because a nickname is 
presumably bestowed upon a person later in life after one’s identity is already 
established, it is thus less “self-defining” despite being a name one regularly “goes by.” 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know at which point in a participant’s life a nickname 
was assumed in the current study with respect to either age or stage of identity formation. 
Previous studies that have ruled out the primacy effect as integral to name-letter biases 
challenge this explanation of later-bestowed nicknames carrying less self-identity punch 
and thereby mitigating implicit egotism. Namely, Hoorens and Todorova (1988) found 
name-letter effects among Bulgarian students’ first and second languages with unique 
alphabets. These authors argue that students do not typically begin their acquisition of a 
second language with the mastery of name letters, and even if they did, it would be “less 
thrilling” the second time around (Hoorens & Todorova, 1988). And representing perhaps 
the strongest argument against nickname initials as not being self-defining enough are 
Feys’ (1991; 1995) studies which were able to induce mere ownership in a laboratory 
setting, including biases for newly-learned name-related symbols.  
Finally, perhaps nicknames are more self-defining for men than women. While 
men may be slower to mature, women—especially during the college years, which was 
the demographic of the current study’s sample—might be more eager to eschew a 
childhood nickname. While this explanation is speculative, men did exhibit a marginally 
significant bias toward their nickname initial on the NLT and were nearly equivocal with 
respect to the humor ratings they assigned to nickname-initial and non-nickname initial 
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writers’ captions. Women, on the other hand, demonstrated statistically significant 
negative biases toward their nickname initial on Cartoon 1. While only the negative 
Cartoon 1 bias displayed by women reached significance, this otherwise consistent trend 
in differences between men’s and women’s nickname initial letter biases is difficult to 
ignore. Men’s vs. women’s self-attitudes toward their nicknames and how “self-defining” 
they are for both genders await future research. 
Whatever the reason nickname initial biases in the current study departed from 
that of typical name letter effects, these results challenge previous researchers’ arguments 
that virtually any self-attribute—provided one indeed associates this attribute with the 
self—can predispose one to gravitate toward the object, person, or place that shares that 
self-attribute. More research is needed on nickname letters’ link to one’s identity and 
whether these stimuli offer the same opportunity for people to self-enhance when 
confronted with these letters. Interestingly, when initial-letter biases for first given names 
were re-examined without participants who indicated they went by a different (i.e., 
nickname) initial, results were nearly identical. Based on this, it is quite possible that 
name-letter preferences are relevant to first given name initials only, even when a person 
“goes by” another name beginning with a different letter. This lends support to the third 
explanation, i.e., that nickname initials are not as closely linked to one’s identity as are 
initials for first given names and thus do not provide the same opportunity to self-enhance 
when confronted with only somewhat self-related stimuli.  
Self-Attitude Accessibility 
 A recent meta-analysis by Krizan and Suls (2008) found self-attitude accessibility 
increased initial-letter biases when explicit self-esteem measures were administered prior 
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to an initial-letter preference task. While participants did exhibit somewhat stronger 
biases when they completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1989) 
prior to the NLT and caption-rating task in the current study, this effect was only 
statistically significant for Cartoon 2. Why increasing respondents’ accessibility of their 
self-attitudes did not replicate previous researchers’ findings across all implicit tasks—
especially the NLT—is curious because the same explicit measure (RSES) and implicit 
measure (NLT) were used. It is possible that the RSES measure was not administered in 
close enough proximity to the name-letter preference tasks to demonstrate an effect on 
the NLT (which participants completed after the caption-rating task). However, based on 
the average amount of time it took participants to complete the experiment—namely, 
16.5 minutes on average—this is unlikely. Moreover, a self-attitude accessibility effect 
was found for the second set of cartoon captions but not the first, which further discounts 
attenuation due to increased temporal proximity and a diminished accessibility of self-
attitudes. In addition, Cartoon 2’s overall name letter effect was nonsignificant and even 
smaller than the name letter effect observed for Cartoon 1 (which was significant), yet a 
self-attitude accessibility effect was still found for Cartoon 2 (but not Cartoon 1). In fact, 
differences in biases between participants with high and low self-attitude accessibility 
were in the opposite direction predicted for Cartoon 1. In sum, the current study’s mixed 
results offer very little support—if any—for increased name-letter preferences when self-
attitudes are more accessible. 
Gender Differences 
 As predicted, women demonstrated significantly stronger first given name initial-
letter biases than men, but only on the NLT. And as discussed previously, men’s 
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nickname biases were marginally significant on the NLT, while women’s were not. 
Unexpectedly, when it came to nickname initials, both men and women exhibited either 
no bias or a negative bias toward these letters on the caption-rating task, with women’s 
negative nickname initial biases reaching significance for Cartoon 1. These lack of 
biases—and sometimes even “reversed” biases—that participants demonstrated toward 
nickname initials in their judgments of humor again raises questions as to whether 
implicit egotism is theoretically relevant to nickname-related stimuli and/or if nicknames 
are as strongly associated with the self for women as they are for men. At least for humor 
judgments in the current study, it appears as though they are not. 
Same-Gender Biases 
 A recent study using a similar variation of a cartoon caption contest found that 
both men and women rated men’s captions as funnier than those created by women, and 
both sexes misattributed humorous captions to having been written by men in a recall test 
(Mickes, Walker, Parris, Mankoff, & Christenfeld, 2012). In the present study, men 
exhibited a significant bias toward captions written by other men for Cartoon 1, however, 
men significantly preferred captions written by women for Cartoon 2. The opposite 
pattern of results emerged for women: they significantly preferred captions written by 
other women for Cartoon 2, but significantly preferred captions written by men for 
Cartoon 1. It is possible that more humorous captions were assigned to these genders for 
these cartoons, however, the gender of caption writers was randomly assigned. Another 
possible explanation is that a man was featured in the first cartoon, and consequently both 
men and women participants unconsciously or consciously favored men writers’ 
perspectives on humorous caption content, while both men and women were featured in 
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the second cartoon. This explanation is still tenuous, since a significant preference for 
women-written captions emerged among both men’s and women’s ratings for Cartoon 2. 
 While in the direction predicted, shared gender with caption writers did not 
significantly increase first given name initial-letter biases, but produced mixed results for 
nickname initial biases. Same gender somewhat mitigated the observed negative bias 
toward nickname initials observed for Cartoon 1, while increasing them for Cartoon 2. It 
is not surprising that the self-relevant trait of gender failed to compound a name-letter 
effect for nickname initials when results of the current study failed to support the notion 
that nicknames are as closely linked to an individual’s identity as are first given names 
(regardless of whether a person “goes by” that name or not) and are thus not as likely to 
fall prey to implicit egotism. Although shared gender did somewhat “buffer” the negative 
biases demonstrated toward nickname initials on the humor task, whether name-letter and 
gender biases work stronger in tandem awaits additional research. 
Implicit Self-Esteem 
 When NLT initial-letter biases were regressed on implicit self-esteem, 
participant’s level of implicit self-esteem significantly predicted first given name initial 
preferences, however, it only accounted for 2% of the variance in these biases. Level of 
implicit self-esteem did not significantly predict initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 or 
Cartoon 2, accounting for only 1% of the variance in these name-letter preferences. With 
implicit self-esteem predicting only 1–2% of the variance in the biases demonstrated on 
both initial-letter preference tasks in the current study, it is questionable as to whether 
name-letter preferences are indeed representative of and/or dependent upon one’s implicit 
self-attitudes. Because a rather large name letter effect was exhibited on the NLT, one 
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would expect more than one-third of the present investigation’s participants to have 
the favorable implicit self-attitudes thought to drive these observed initial-letter biases. 
Moreover, increasing the accessibility for what some researchers have argued are the 
overwhelming positive self-attitudes responsible for name-letter preferences did not 
consistently or significantly increase respondents’ initial-letter ratings, or their ratings for 
captions submitted by same-initial writers. While implicit self-esteem may play some role 
in name-letter biases—in the current study, its role was very small indeed—it cannot 
fully account for our predisposition to gravitate toward self-related objects. 
Self-Concept Threats 
 Casting further doubt on the role of self-esteem in name-letter preferences, a 
threat to the self-concept did not increase biases—not even for those with high explicit 
self-esteem. Previous researchers have found name-letter biases to diverge among those 
with high vs. low explicit self-esteem after experiencing a temporary threat to the self-
concept. Again, tempering a threat to the self-concept is thought to be well-practiced 
among those with high explicit self-esteem, suggesting classical conditioning 
underpinnings of the name letter effect. To this end, researchers argue that name letters 
and other self-related symbols are “fundamentally rewarding” and “the rough 
psychological equivalent of meat powder to a hungry puppy” (Jones et al., 2004, p. 680). 
Despite using these researchers’ method for delivering a self-concept threat and the same 
name-letter preference measure, a threat to the self-concept was not a strong enough 
motive for participants to self-enhance when confronted with their name letters, 
regardless of their level of explicit self-esteem. Results of the present investigation do not 




 What does the present study contribute to our understanding of implicit egotism 
and name-letter preferences? It has demonstrated that implicit egotism is still a prevalent 
social psychological phenomenon that exists not only among letter attractiveness ratings 
on the NLT, but also in judgments of humor—albeit to a lesser degree. Additional 
support for gender differences in NLT initial-letter biases was found, while findings for 
the role self-attitude accessibility played across name-letter preference tasks were weak 
and inconsistent. Previous findings of name-letter biases diverging among participants 
with high and low explicit self-esteem in response to a self-concept threat were not 
replicated. The impact of implicit self-esteem on initial-letter biases was examined, with 
level of implicit self-esteem only accounting for less than a fraction of the variance in 
name-letter preferences. Shared gender, when coupled with a shared initial with a caption 
writer, increased biases toward these writers’ captions, but not significantly so. But 
perhaps one of the most surprising and interesting findings was that significant name 
letter effects were not found for nickname initials on the NLT or on the humor judgments 
task.  
 Does the NLT simply measure implicit self-esteem? Buhrmester, Blanton, and 
Swann (2011) argue that it does not. While the NLT is often used by researchers as an 
index of implicit self-esteem, these authors suggest that using the NLT to assess implicit 
self-attitudes is not recommended and that it is best understood as a measure of implicit 
egotism. In their review, Buhrmester et al. (2011) cite studies where participants appeared 
to have conscious access to unconscious feelings of self-worth (Gailliot & Schmeichel, 
2006) and instances where approximately half of respondents recognized the self-
 112 
 
referential nature of the NLT (Krizan, 2008). These and other examples have led 
Buhrmester et al. (2011) to believe that instruments researchers have been using as 
implicit measures of self-esteem (including the NLT) might not be immune to the self-
presentational biases inherent in explicit measures and “might be contaminated with 
conscious content that is not of theoretic interest” (p. 371). Consequently, implicit 
instruments such as the NLT may not be tapping the unconscious processes it purports to 
measure. Finally, because implicit self-esteem measures—including the NLT—did not 
predict general well-being and depression nowhere near as well as explicit measures did 
in their meta-analysis, the authors are justifiably skeptical about the NLT’s ability to tap 
self-esteem. 
Implicit egotism researchers explain the name letter effect as a consequence of 
people overwhelmingly possessing positive self-attitudes (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 
2005). Buhrmester et al. (2011) argue that such an explanation is questionable because 
not everyone can have high implicit self-esteem. Results of the current study showed less 
than one-third of participants had the high implicit self-esteem that—up until recently—
has been widely accepted as the mechanism driving name-letter preferences, challenging 
the notion that people overwhelmingly possess favorable self-attitudes. To further 
undercut such a rose-colored view of a population with “uniformly positive” implicit self-
attitudes, Burhmester et al. (2011) argue that other researchers (Cassidy, 1988; 
Sroufe,1989; Diener & Diener, 1995) have found that as much as one-third of children 
possess insecure parent attachments, which have predicted incidence of low self-esteem 
later in life. These insecure attachments styles are the very ones that authors such as 
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DeHart, Pelham, and Tennen (2006) have found to be associated with low implicit 
self-esteem in adulthood. 
The improbability and lack of evidence in the current study that positive implicit 
self-esteem is the norm, coupled with previous researchers’ correlations between implicit 
and explicit measures increasing under cognitive load (Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van 
Knippenberg, 2001) all suggest that the first available self-referential piece of 
information is used in making implicit global self-assessments. Depleting participants’ 
cognitive resources compromises what Buhrmester et al. (2011) refer to as the “depth of 
self-insight” necessary for making such an assessment and thus “removing the self from 
self-relevant responding” (p. 376). These same researchers argue that the NLT in 
particular also precludes “breadth of self-insight” because self-esteem is extremely multi-
faceted, yet the measure examines only a single aspect of participants’ self-regard—
namely, for their initials—in hopes that this one facet will translate to a much larger 
global view of self-worth.  
It is more probable that compromising cognitive resources triggers results in line 
with implicit egotism because participants rely instead on automatic positivity biases 
rather than an authentic implicit global view of self. Activation of a universal positivity 
bias might explain the prevailing belief that people overwhelmingly possess favorable 
self-attitudes, i.e., “positive implicit self-esteem.” Robust name-letter preferences need 
not be dependent on/reflective of one’s level of implicit self-esteem. As to what the NLT 
measures exactly, Buhrmester et al. (2011) again suggest that it is best understood as a 
measure for which it was first designed, implicit egotism—the tendency to display 
automatic positivity biases—instead of a measure of implicit self-attitudes. 
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 What were the correlations between the NLT, implicit self-esteem, and 
explicit self-esteem? In the present study, level of implicit self-esteem significantly 
predicted initial-letter biases on the NLT, but only accounted for 2% of the variance in 
biases, R
2
 = .02, F(2, 417) = 3.58, N = 420, p = .03. And when implicit self-esteem was 
treated as a continuous variable, the correlation between NLT biases and implicit self-
esteem as measured by name-liking ratings became nonsignificant, r = .09, N = 420,        
p = .06. NLT scores were unrelated to explicit self-esteem as measured by the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1989), r = .03, N = 410, p = .56, while implicit 
self-esteem as measured by name-liking (Gebauer et al., 2008) was highly and 
significantly correlated with explicit self-esteem (r = .26, N = 468, p < .001). Results of 
the present study do not support name-letter preferences as dependent on or wholly 
reflective of one’s self-esteem—either implicit or explicit.  
 A closer look at the semi-partial correlations between level of implicit self-esteem 
and initial-letter biases while controlling for the effect of NLT scores on biases presents 
somewhat discouraging information about the unique variance that Gebauer et al.’s 
(2008) implicit self-esteem measure accounted for. Recall that level of implicit self-
esteem was significantly but weakly correlated with NLT initial-letter biases and 
significantly predicted biases on this name-letter preference task only. And while implicit 
self-esteem level was associated with biases on the remaining tasks in the predicted 
directions (biases were negatively associated with low implicit self-esteem and positively 
associated with high implicit self-esteem), level of implicit self-esteem did not reach 
significance as a predictor in any of the comparisons. Nevertheless, because implicit self-
esteem level accounted for a significant (yet very modest) proportion of the variance in 
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NLT biases, the relationship between implicit self-esteem and initial-letter biases on 
the remaining name-letter preference tasks was examined while controlling for the effects 
of NLT scores.  
While the zero-order correlations were not statistically significant to begin with, 
the semi-partial correlations decreased further once the effect of NLT biases were 
residualized from biases exhibited on the cartoon caption rating task. For example, zero-
order correlations between low vs. high implicit self-esteem and cartoon caption biases 
ranged from r = .07–.12 (all ps > .10). But when the effect of NLT biases was 
residualized from caption biases, semi-partial correlations decreased to r = .03–.06, all of 
which were also nonsignificant (all ps > .46). While the zero-order correlations were 
originally also nonsignificant, it does appear that at least some—even as much as half—
of the variance in initial-letter biases exhibited on the cartoon caption rating tasks can be 
accounted for by NLT biases.  
Implicit self-esteem was significantly correlated with explicit self-esteem as 
measured by name-liking and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), respectively,      
r = .26, p < .001. Explicit self-esteem was only weakly related to average biases exhibited 
on the caption-rating tasks, r = .09, p = .07, and was unrelated to NLT biases, r = .03,     
p = .56, even though previous research has found a weak, yet significant correlation of     
r = .12 between the NLT and RSES (Krizan & Suls, 2008). Two diametrically opposed 
inferences can be made for low correlations: either the implicit measure did not tap the 
intended construct—thereby challenging the measure’s validity—or the two measures tap 
two conceptually different constructs—supporting the measure’s discriminant validity 
(LeBel & Gawronski, 2009).  
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If the NLT does tap some aspect of self-esteem, then when compared to well-
established measures of explicit self-esteem such as the RSES, this study’s results 
support the NLT’s discriminant validity. However, such a conclusion is tenuous at best 
because lack of support for convergent validity does not discriminant validity make. 
Buhrmester et al. (2011) said it best when criticizing a crafty approach for enhancing 
another implicit measure’s test-retest reliability estimates and the same notion applies 
here: such an assumption would be “similar to elevating one’s estimate of a basketball 
player’s shooting ability based on his poor dribbling skills” (p. 367). 
On the other hand, high correlations—such as the one observed in the current 
study between the implicit self-esteem name-liking measure and the explicit index of 
self-esteem (RSES)—carry a different set of possible interpretations. Either the implicit 
measure of self-esteem really did tap the intended construct of unconscious global self-
worth—demonstrating its convergent validity with the explicit self-esteem measure—    
or the implicit measure was contaminated with explicit processes (LeBel & Gawronski, 
2009). However, because name-liking likely taps autobiographical information—at least 
arguably more so than unconscious name-letter preferences—this gives support for the 
implicit measure’s convergent validity with the RSES. Moreover, just as name-letter 
biases did not significantly increase when the RSES was administered prior to the NLT, 
name-liking also was not stronger among participants whose explicit self-attitudes had 
been primed, i.e., made more accessible, prior to the implicit self-esteem (name-liking) 
measure as compared to those who completed the name-liking measure first, t(466) =      
–.55, p = .58. Therefore, the implicit self-esteem measure could not have been 
contaminated by readily available explicit self-attitudes. 
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     Limitations of the Current Study 
Web-Based Research 
 One limitation of the current investigation is the lack of control and consistency 
over the experimental setting. Because the study was designed to be completed online, 
participants were free to take part in the experiment from any campus or personal 
computer that had a connection to the internet. An inherent pitfall of web-based research 
is that respondents may have been distracted by any number of factors, which could have 
potentially compromised their attention to the experiment. Because a researcher could not 
be present during the administration of the experiment in this type of environment, it is 
unknown whether such distractions may have prevented participants from providing their 
undivided attention to the study. However, the implicit processes underlying name-letter 
preferences are not dependent upon large amounts of cognitive resources and occur very 
efficiently. 
In a similar vein, the amount of time participants spent completing the experiment 
could not be monitored and as a result, a small percentage of respondents had completion 
times that exceeded the amount of credit they were compensated for their participation 
(one hour). Unlike participants who might have spent too little time completing the 
experiment, long completion times suggest that participants might have begun the 
experiment and returned to it at a later time and/or did not rely on their “gut” feelings 
when assigning relevant attractiveness or humor ratings to name-letter stimuli. Thus, a 
conservative approach to these issues was to perform parallel analyses both with and 
without data from respondents with unusually short or long completion times. 
Fortunately, these concerns were unsubstantiated. Results were extremely similar, if not 
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identical, when analyses both excluded or included data from participants with short 
or long completion times. Moreover, the key dependent variables in the present study 
required little more than a heuristic-based judgment based on a rapid “gut” feeling, thus 
even under conditions of high cognitive load, an effect would still likely have been found. 
Indeed, rather large effect sizes were found for initial-letter biases, at least on the NLT.  
A Note on Randomization 
 Men and women participants were randomly assigned to complete 1 of 24 
surveys. The surveys were identical in content (with the exception of three different 
threat conditions) and consisted of two orders of explicit-implicit measures and four 
orders of captions. Every effort was taken to make aspects of the experiment random, 
however, all features were not possible to randomize using the technology of the web-
based research tool. For example, while some researchers administer the NLT using one 
fixed random display order of alphabet letters (LeBel & Campbell, 2009), others have 
used several different random alphabet orders (Stieger & LeBel, 2012; Koole, et al, 2001; 
Nuttin, 1987) or even individual random orders (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
Ideally, at least several random orders would have been used in the present study, 
however, the number of surveys required to allow randomization of even the most 
essential experiment features already resulted in 48 surveys, including 24 surveys for 
men and 24 surveys for women. Manipulating alphabet order even at a minimum level 
with two different display orders would have required nearly 100 unique surveys. 
Because component parts of individual questions could not be randomized in the current 
study without creating numerous additional versions of the survey, the researcher focused 
on randomizing only the most critical experiment features, i.e., assignment of participants 
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to one of three self-concept threat conditions, one of two explicit-implicit measure 
orders, and one of four cartoon caption orders.  
Captions were displayed in one of two random orders for each cartoon—forward 
or backward—with the forward order displaying a random arrangement of captions and 
the backward order displaying these same captions, but in reverse order. Thus, 
participants were randomly assigned to surveys that featured one of four caption orders 
for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2, i.e., forward-forward, forward-backward, backward-
backward, and backward-forward. Statistically, a one-way ANOVA revealed no 
significant differences among average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases 
between the four different caption orders, F(3, 390) = 1.76, p = .16. Methodologically, 
this caption arrangement marks an improvement over previous researchers’ methods 
which utilized a single fixed random order of name-letter candybars for all participants 
(Brendl et al., 2005).  
Is the I-Algorithm Too Conservative? 
When scoring the NLT, most researchers use the baseline-corrected algorithm 
(“B-algorithm”) to compute name-letter preferences (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009). This 
method involves simply subtracting normative baseline letter ratings from participants’ 
initial-letter ratings. While widely used, the B-algorithm has several issues including the 
production of skewed distributions and large standard deviations, while failing to control 
for participants’ individual response tendencies such as those due to differences in mood 
or affect (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009).  
LeBel and Gawronski (2009) recommend the use of the ipsatized double-
correction algorithm (“I-algorithm”) when computing name-letter preference scores, 
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based on results obtained after re-analyzing 18 different sets of studies that used the 
NLT. To compute scores, letter ratings are first ipsatized by subtracting the mean rating 
assigned to non-initial letters from all letter ratings—including both non-initials and 
initials. Next, normative ipsatized baseline letter ratings (assigned by participants who 
did not have that initial) are subtracted from respondents’ ipsatized initial-letter rating.  
This algorithm offers both methodological advantages as well as statistical 
benefits. Methodologically, the I-algorithm double-corrects at the individual and group 
level. First, it controls for participants’ individual response tendencies—such as those due 
to mood, affect, or acquiescence—by ipsatizing letter ratings as described above. Second, 
it controls for aesthetic variability in name-letter stimuli by subtracting normative 
ipsatized baseline ratings from respondents’ ipsatized initial-letter rating. In the current 
study, the I-algorithm’s methodological superiority was especially desirable when it came 
to computing initial-letter biases in the cartoon caption tasks because it a) controlled for 
individual response tendencies due to mood, affect, and acquiescence in the first step of 
the calculation, and b) controlled for baseline differences in captions’ humor in the 
second step. And in LeBel & Gawronski’s (2009) meta-analysis, the I-algorithm boasted 
the following statistical advantages: high reliability estimates, the lowest levels of 
skewness/kurtosis, zero outliers, while introducing very little error due to the algorithm’s 
control over participants’ individual response tendencies and baseline letter 
attractiveness. 
Despite these benefits and its well-documented optimality, some might argue that 
the I-algorithm is an overly conservative method for computing initial-letter biases 
because it doubly corrects initial-letter ratings. Doing so might serve to attenuate a name 
 121 
 
letter effect that might have been otherwise observed if a less conservative algorithm 
had been used, such as the B-algorithm or S-algorithm. To examine this possibility, 
overall initial-letter biases were re-analyzed using each of the four other scoring 
algorithms (the B-algorithm, S-algorithm, D-algorithm, and Z-algorithm).  
Initial-letter biases on the NLT were highly significant using all five algorithms 
(all ps < .001), with effect sizes ranging from d = .68–1.01. Biases on Cartoon 1 were 
significant on all algorithms (all ps < .05; all ds = .10–.19), except for the D-algorithm, 
which produced a negative but nonsignificant name letter effect. Interestingly, the D-
algorithm was the only algorithm that found significant initial-letter biases on Cartoon 2, 
but these biases were also negative in valence. When biases on both Cartoon 1 and 
Cartoon 2 captions were averaged together, all algorithms except for the B-algorithm 
found significant name letter effects (all ps < .01), with effect sizes ranging from d = –.16 
(again, the D-algorithm) to d = .17 (S-algorithm).  
The S-algorithm was the only algorithm to find a significant and positive name 
letter effect for nickname initials on the NLT (p < .001, d = .37), while only the D-
algorithm’s computation of negative initial-letter biases observed for the cartoon caption 
tasks consistently reached significance across all analyses (all ps < .05, all ds = –.32 to    
–.43). Negative nickname-initial biases computed with the I-algorithm were significant  
(p = .05, d = –.29) only when scores were averaged across both sets of captions. Please 
refer to Table 16 for average initial-letter biases as computed by each of the five scoring 
algorithms. 
Based on these supplementary analyses, the I-algorithm does not appear to have 




























two of the less conservative scoring algorithms (the B-algorithm and S-algorithm). In 
fact, initial-letter biases computed using the I-algorithm were very highly correlated with 
both of these algorithms, as well as the two other algorithms (all rs > .87, all ps < .001). 
Of the five algorithms, the D-algorithm produced the weakest initial-letter biases, 
however this may be because it produced the largest number of extreme values on the 
low end of the distribution—as many as 12 potential NLT outliers and 7 outliers in the 
analysis of average initial-letter biases on both cartoons’ captions. LeBel and Gawronski 
(2009) also found the D-algorithm fared the worst out of the five algorithms with respect 
to the production of outliers. In the current study, the I-algorithm produced one of the 
lowest numbers of potential outliers, second only to the B-algorithm—which does not 
correct for individual response tendencies. Based on past and current research, the I-
algorithm seems to indeed be the optimal scoring method for computing name-letter 
biases in this and future studies on the name letter effect. 
Future Research on Name-Letter Biases 
 One of the most surprising and interesting findings of the present study was that 
significant name letter effects were not found for nickname initials on the NLT or on the 
humor judgments task and only a small, marginally significant nickname letter bias was 
found for men on the NLT. Based on the difference observed between men’s and 
women’s affinity for nickname initials, are nicknames more self-defining for men than 
they are for women? Or, are nicknames equally self-defining for men and women, but 
women possess negative affect toward their nicknames and nickname initials? The latter 
explanation seems tenable—at least when it came to assigning humor ratings to captions 
submitted by same-nickname initial writers. Women demonstrated a consistent trend of 
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negative biases toward same-nickname initial writers’ captions, which reached 
significance for Cartoon 1. While only the Cartoon 1 nickname-initial biases exhibited by 
women reached significance, this otherwise consistent trend is difficult to ignore. 
Based on the present study’s unexpected, yet consistent findings for either 
negative or zero-biases demonstrated toward nickname letters, it behooves future 
researchers examining name-letter biases to make the distinction between first given 
names and nicknames as participants’ target of bias. Subsuming both types of names 
under a single category is cautioned because it is unclear to what degree observed name-
letter preferences thus far may have been attenuated by nicknames which might not be 
imbued with the same self-defining properties as one’s first given name—even for people 
who “go by” a nickname. Researchers would be wise to query participants directly for 
their first given name—if different from the name they go by—to avoid making a Type II 
error. Moreover, doing so will provide additional opportunities to examine nickname 
letters as self-referential stimuli or whether confrontation with nickname letters triggers 
intervening cognitive processes that may serve to mitigate or even reverse the name letter 
effect, as was the case with the current study.  
 Likewise, and based on the present investigation’s results, single-item measures 
of implicit self-esteem might be adapted to assess participants’ nickname-liking 
specifically, if they go by such a name. It is unclear which name respondents used to 
make their name-liking ratings on this measure and, consequently, whether this measure 
accurately examined nicknamed participants’ implicit self-esteem. If nicknames are not 
as self-referential as are first given names like the findings of this study suggest—or 
alternatively, if they are self-defining, but carry negative affect for some women—then 
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we might not have an accurate picture of participants’ implicit self-esteem if they 
relied on liking of their nicknames while completing this measure. 
More research is needed to differentiate the NLT as an implicit self-esteem 
instrument versus a measure of implicit egotism. Does it measure one’s unconscious 
global self-worth, or is it best understood merely as an index of one’s predisposition to 
rely on universal automatic self-positivity biases? While the tendency to rely on 
automatic positivity biases might be universal, implicit self-esteem cannot. Initial-letter 
biases were smaller—and in some instances even reversed—among those with low 
implicit self-esteem, however, this effect did not reach statistical significance. Level of 
implicit self-esteem as a whole only predicted a very small proportion (1–2%) of first 
given name initial-letter biases on both of the name-letter preference tasks, and NLT 
biases were uncorrelated with explicit self-esteem. Results of the current study suggest 
that name-letter preferences are not synonymous with implicit self-esteem and that 
favorable self-attitudes—whether implicit or explicit—are not a necessary condition of 
initial-letter biases. Just because people possess a universal dominant response tendency 
to prefer their name letters does not mean this preference is diagnostic of high implicit 
self-esteem. In the present study, less than one-third of participants possessed the 
favorable self-attitudes thought to drive name-letter preferences. 
Jones et al. (2004) have suggested that important decisions—such as choices in 
mates, careers, and places of residence—are inherently threatening to the self-concept 
because these decisions carry costly consequences. As such, implicit egotism—as defined 
by the tendency to gravitate toward people, jobs, and cities/states that share our self-
attributes—might serve the purpose of an unconscious “safety signal,’’ with presumably 
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the least threatening person an individual knows being him or herself. Thus, by 
association, self-related targets are deemed the “safe” and least-threatening choice among 
the larger array. Such a “threat-buffering function” view of implicit egotism says nothing 
about people’s favorable self-attitudes spilling over into evaluations of self-related 
objects. In fact, people who feel good about themselves should not be as threatened by 
important life decisions and should therefore not be as apt to rely on the unconscious 
“safety signal” broadcast by name letters, as compared to those who do not possess such 
favorable self-attitudes and self-confidence.  
On the contrary, previous researchers have found temporary threats to the self-
concept can serve as a motive for participants to self-enhance when confronted with 
name-letter stimuli, particularly among those with high explicit self-esteem. In the 
current study, however, evidence of implicit egotism’s function as a safety signal or 
similar self-regulating purpose following a threat to the self-concept was not found (even 
on the NLT which demonstrated a very strong name letter effect). This is unexpected and 
difficult to explain because measures of explicit self-esteem and the threat manipulation 
were identical to the ones used by previous researchers who observed such an interaction 
(Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002). Additional research is needed in order to 
further investigate whether preferring our name letters serves a self-regulating (or other) 
function and whether there are unconscious self-serving benefits to be had for exhibiting 
biases toward these self-related stimuli. 
A trend for the additive effects of shared gender on initial-letter biases was found. 
Extensions and replications of these effects are needed to firmly establish this dual source 
of bias toward self-related attributes. Recently, the 281
st
 real-life New Yorker cartoon 
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caption contest was won by film critic Roger Ebert, which might be less than 
surprising to those who allege Mr. Ebert had “a leg up” in the competition due to his 
celebrity. However, social psychologists—and implicit egotism researchers in 
particular—might argue he had two: his gender and his name letters he shared with New 
Yorker cartoon caption contest editor Robert Mankoff. Whether Robert’s self-relevant 
trait of gender and the name letters he shared with Roger—four letters in total—worked 
in tandem to land the famous film critic among the weekly contest’s finalists is unknown, 
but to scientific minds fascinated with dissecting humor, it’s great fun to speculate. After 
all, for participant judges in the current cartoon caption contest study, shared name letters 
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APPENDIX A 




Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about 
yourself. If you strongly agree, choose SA. If you agree with the statement, choose A.  





1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.      SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
2. At times, I think I am no good at all.      SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.     SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.   SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.     SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
6. I certainly feel useless at times.      SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
7. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.  SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.    SA  A  D  SD 
 
 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.     SA  A  D  SD 
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APPENDIX C 
 




Instructions:  This portion of the study is concerned with aesthetic judgments of lexical stimuli.  While it 
might seem unusual to evaluate the letters of the alphabet in terms of their beauty, previous research has 
found such judgments to foster a better understanding of language and human emotions.  Please estimate 
how beautiful you find each of the following letters using your “gut feelings.” 
 
 
Q      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
D       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
U       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
Y      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
I         (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
G      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
R      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
T       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
P       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
M      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
A       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
B       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
H        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
 
X       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
J        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
K       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
E       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
 
S        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                              beautiful 
 
L        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
        not at all                                                                      extremely   
          beautiful                               beautiful 
  
F        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
       not at all                                                                      extremely   
         beautiful                             beautiful 
  
O        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
        not at all                                                                      extremely   
          beautiful                               beautiful 
 
Z        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
         not at all                                                                      extremely   
            beautiful                                   beautiful 
 
V         (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
         not at all                                                                      extremely   
            beautiful                                beautiful 
 
N         (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
         not at all                                                                      extremely   
            beautiful                                beautiful 
 
W        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
         not at all                                                                      extremely   
            beautiful                                beautiful 
 
C        (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6)         (7) 
         not at all                                                                      extremely   
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